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INTRODUCTION
he law of war is replete with indeterminacies, which ex-
tend to the core precepts of this body of law, namely, the
principles of distinction, precaution, proportionality, and hu-
manity.1The extent of ambiguity in the law of war and the broad
1. Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Ex-
ecutive Branch is a “They,” Not an “It”, 96 MINN. L. REV. 194, 241@42 (2011)
(pointing to indeterminate norms of the law of war, Rao observes, “[t]he malle-
ability of these standards allows for multiple interpretations.”); Id. at 201 (not-
ing that “[n]ew types of warfare and evolving technological capacity make in-
determinacy about the content and application of international law particu-
larly acute.”); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT
INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 60 (2007) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH] (“The
laws of war are often written in vague terms, and are subject to different in-
terpretations. They prohibit, for example, 0disproportionate’ casualties and
0outrages upon personal dignity’?terms that can mean very different things to
different people, and that can easily be used as rhetorical weapons.”); Antonio
T
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range of interpretive approaches such indeterminacy admits
have led Zavid Dennedy to conclude that as “strange as it may
seem, there is simply more than one law of armed conflict, as
enforced by different jurisdictions and as viewed by different
participantsK”2 From a humanitarian perspective, current inde-
terminacies in the law of war have a devastating effect because
they make this body of law amenable to manipulation by bellig-
erent parties, leaving them free to pursue an extremely permis-
sive interpretation of the law, contrived to align with military
self-interest. Indeterminacy in the law of war also fosters arbi-
trariness and inequality in the enforcement of the law by various
compliance agents, which discredits the law and further encour-
ages belligerent parties to exploit indeterminacies in the law to
advance their military aims. The term “compliance agent” is deL
fined here broadly to encompass any international or national
audience whose response to a violation by a state of the law of
war represents the cost to the state of such violation. Among
compliance agents are other states, international courts, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and foreign and domestic
public opinion.
This article reviews the causes of indeterminacy in the law of
war, which concern (a) the large number of contingencies that
must be explored in the legislation of determinate norms of the
law of war and the legislative costs that attach to such an effort;
(b) the deficiencies of the primary mechanism for generating
norms of the law of war?multilateral treaty negotiations?a
legislative environment least conducive to the exploration of a
large number of contingencies; and (c) the high-stakes subject
Cassese, On Some Merits of the Israeli Judgment on Targeted Killings, 5 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 339, 341 (2007) (“It is common knowledge that most rules of
international humanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities . . . are rather
broad and ambiguous.”); Amichai Cohen, Legal Operational Advice in the Is-
raeli Defense Forces: The International Law Department and the Changing Na-
ture of International Humanitarian Law, 26 CONN. J. INT’L L. 367, 389 (2011)
[hereinafter Cohen, Legal Operational Advice] (observing that “modern inter-
national humanitarian law actually leaves a lot of questions unanswered. It is
replete with gray areas and ambiguities, many of which were intentional.”); id.
at 382 (considering ambiguities to be “the main problem with international
humanitarian law.”); Matthew E. Winter, “Finding the Law”—The Values,
Identity, And Function of the International Law Adviser, 128 MIL. L. REV. 1, 9
(1990) (observing that “the law of war contains 0more gray areas than black
and white.’”).
2. DAVIDKENNEDY, OFWAR AND LAW 38 (2006).
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matter of the law of war, which implicates the most pressing in-
terests of states. This article argues that the causes of current
indeterminacy in the law of war would persist with equal force
to frustrate future attempts to increase determinacy in the law
by concluding additional multilateral treaties. This prediction is
consistent with the broad recognition in the legal literature of
the prohibitive costs of renegotiating multilateral treaties.3
This article explores an avenue for allaying the adverse conse-
quences of indeterminacy in the law of war, which is not treaty-
based, but rather turns on the exercise by the U.N. Security
Council (SC) of its powers under the U.N. Charter in the fulfill-
ment of its responsibility to maintain international peace and
security.4 The article argues that indeterminacy in the law of
war may be allayed through a model of an optional bargain be-
tween each state and the SC. As part of the bargain, the SC
would offer incentives to states to cede the advantages they de-
rive from the indeterminacy of the law of war (i.e., the possibility
of pursuing an extremely permissive interpretation of it) by sub-
scribing to an international advisory regime Q“advisory regime”PO
undertaking to follow an interpretation of the law of war laid out
by international legal advisors.
This bargain would not take the form of an agreement between
the SC and the states that subscribe to the advisory regime Q“opL
erating states”P regarding the content of particular norms of the
law of war. Rather, it would stipulate a general interpretive ap-
proach to the law of war that would guide the interpretive efforts
of the advisors. The application of such an interpretive approach
would be secured not through limitations imposed upon the in-
terpretive discretion of the international advisors, but rather
through the selection of advisors, tailored to ensure that they are
inclined to embrace the desired interpretive approach.
3. Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of
International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 353 (2008) [hereinafter Blum, Bi-
lateralism, Multilateralism] (“Multilateral regimes enjoy a substantial degree
of stability, a derivative of the prohibitive costs of renegotiations among treaty
members. . . .”); Amichai Cohen, Rules and Standards in the Application of
International Humanitarian Law, 41 ISR. L. REV. 41, 60 (2008) [hereinafter
Cohen, Rules and Standards] (observing that “changes in international trea-
ties are in any case prohibitively expensive.”); EMILY CRAWFORD, IDENTIFYING
THE ENEMY: CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN ARMED CONFLICT 208 (2015) (elaborat-
ing on the barriers for the adoption of a new multilateral humanitarian law
treaty, “some of which seem potentially insurmountable.”).
4. U.N. Charter, arts. 24@25, 39.
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The advisory regime would offer operating states, as well as
individuals acting on their behalf, comprehensive protections
against adjudicative enforcement measures that concern mili-
tary operations conducted by the state in the course of an armed
conflict, insofar as the state follows the legal guidance provided
by the international advisors. These protections, grounded in the
exercise by the SC of its binding powers under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter,5 would extend to the realms of both criminal
and non-criminal adjudication conducted before any interna-
tional or foreign national court. The terms of the advisory regime
would also significantly reduce the likelihood that a state sub-
scribing to it would be subject to economic sanctions imposed in
response to its military operations. The appeal of the advisory
regime for states would transcend protections against enforce-
ment measures and extend to the opportunity to secure the rep-
utational and legitimacy benefits attached to compliance with
the law of war.
The desirability of the advisory regime from a humanitarian
perspective, as well as its political feasibility in terms of its ap-
peal for the various states, depend on the nature of the general
interpretive approach that would dominate the work of the in-
ternational advisors. This article identifies an interpretive ap-
proach to the law of war that would make the proposed advisory
regime the best bargain from a humanitarian perspective that is
politically feasible. The proposed interpretive approach marks
the farthest point a state would be willing to stray from the most
permissive interpretive approach to the law of war emanating
from indeterminacy in the law to secure the benefits that the
advisory regime offers.
The proposed advisory regime is preferable, from a humanitar-
ian perspective, to current indeterminacy in the law. Indetermi-
nacy in the law gives rise to diverging interpretations of partic-
ular norms of the law of war, both by states engaged in an armed
conflict and by various compliance agents. Such divergence may
result in compliance agents treating a state as a violator of the
law of war, triggering enforcement measures directed against
the state and its agents, and exacting a reputational cost for the
state Q“non-compliance costs”PK But the effectiveness of such poL
tential non-compliance costs in influencing state conduct is cur-
rently diminished by the gap between the most a state would be
5. See infra Part IV.
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willing to concede by restraining its military efforts to avoid
these costs, and the far more restrictive understanding of the
liberties the state can take in the conduct of military operations
advanced by various compliance agents. This article demon-
strates that the bargain underlying the advisory regime would
allow the SC to leverage the potential non-compliance costs for
a state resulting from current indeterminacy in the law in a
manner that increases the influence of such costs on state con-
duct.
A state would be able to subscribe to the proposed advisory re-
gime by undertaking to act in accordance with the international
advisors’ interpretation of the law of warO and to otherwise coopL
erate with the advisors in accordance with the guidelines set
forth by the SC for the operation of the advisory mechanism. To
enhance the political feasibility of the proposed advisory regime,
these obligations would not be legally binding upon the operat-
ing state, as opposed to the binding nature of the norms of the
law of war themselves. The obligations undertaken by an oper-
ating state under the advisory regime would qualify as what the
literature refers to as “soft lawK”6 This article argues that despite
their non-binding nature, these obligations would have a strong
compliance pull and go a long way to induce states to follow the
legal guidance provided by the international advisors.
The international advisors would lay out a body of instruc-
tions, which would contain the norms of the law of war as inter-
preted by the advisors. The instructions would form the bulk of
the legal guidance provided to an operating state under the ad-
visory regime. Operating states would typically subscribe to the
advisory regime during peacetime, and most of the legal guid-
ance contained in the instructions would be published in the ab-
sence of an armed conflict. The advisory role of the international
advisors would not extend to the provision of ex ante, real-time
advice on the legality of particular operations planned by the
military, a function that would remain the exclusive domain of
domestic military lawyers.
The advisory regime would apply to hostilities amounting to
either an international or non-international armed conflict. The
legal guidance provided under this regime would consist of the
law of warK Because “the law of occupation developed as part of
6. See infra notes 97@98 and accompanying text.
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the law of warO”7 the advisory regime would also apply to situa-
tions of occupation, with all references to the law of war in this
article concerning both the law regulating the conduct of hostil-
ities amounting to an armed conflict and the international law
of occupation.
The main vehicle by which the bargain underlying the advi-
sory regime would be put into action would take the form of an
oversight mechanism that the international advisors would use
to monitor compliance with the law of war by an operating state.
If, based on the information available to them, the advisors are
concerned that a particular action taken by the state may be in-
consistent with the law of war, they would initiate a post facto
review of such action. The protections against adjudicative en-
forcement measures available to the operating state and its
agents under the advisory regime would be removed with regard
to conduct that the advisors have determined, upon completion
of the post facto review, to be in violation of the law of war. Pro-
tections from economic sanctions and the reputational and legit-
imacy benefits attached to a stamp of legality provided by the
advisory regime to the military operations of a state would also
be linked to the views taken by the advisors in the exercise of
their oversight role.
The advisory regime would operate under the auspices of the
SC, and its terms would be laid out by an SC resolution. This
article demonstrates that the powers of the SC under the U.N.
Charter accommodate the establishment by the SC of the pro-
posed advisory regime, including the limitations on the jurisdic-
tion of both international and national courts required under the
terms of the advisory regime.
Part I of this article will briefly illustrate the indeterminacy in
the law of war. It will also review the causes of indeterminacy in
the law of war and its costs. Part II will discuss the terms of the
bargain underlying the advisory regime, which concern the in-
terpretive approach to the law of war used by the international
advisors and the benefits that the advisory regime holds for
states. Part II will also elaborate on the significance of the soft
law obligations undertaken by an operating state under the ad-
visory regime. Part III will describe the criteria and process for
the selection of international advisors. It will also elaborate on
7. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OFOCCUPATION 2 (2012).
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the form of the legal guidance that would be provided by the pro-
posed advisory mechanism to states, as well as delineate the
framework for a process of post facto review by the advisors of
the legality of the military actions of an operating state. Part IV
will examine the purview of SC powers under the U.N. Charter
and show that these powers allow for the introduction of the ad-
visory regime by way of SC action. It will also elaborate on the
scope and significance of the protections against adjudicative en-
forcement measures provided to an operating state and its
agents under the advisory regime. Part IV will conclude by ex-
amining the extent of protections against economic sanctions
that could be afforded to states under the advisory regime as an
incentive to follow the legal guidance provided by the advisors.
I. THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INDETERMINACY IN THE
LAW OFWAR
The law of war is vague. Consider the principle of distinction,
which allows directing attacks against combatants and gener-
ally prohibits attacking civilians.8 In the case of an armed con-
flict between a state and an armed group, it is often unclear
whether members of the group are considered combatants or ci-
vilians.9 An exception to the prohibition against attacking civil-
ians holds that civilians may be targeted when they “take a diL
rect part in hostilitiesK”10 Yet, the distinction between direct par-
ticipation in hostilities, which removes the protection from at-
tack afforded to civilians, and indirect participation in the hos-
tilities, which does not have such effect, remains unclear.11 The
principle of distinction further requires belligerents to distin-
guish between military objects, which may legitimately be at-
tacked, and civilian objects, which may not.12 In the case of in-
frastructure that serves both the civilian population and the mil-
itary (e.g., power plants, oil refineries), the criteria for classify-
ing objects as either military or civilian are unclear.13 The law of
war limits the permission to launch attacks that may result in
8. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 48,
51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
9. See infra notes 126@27 and accompanying text.
10. Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(3).
11. See infra notes 129@131 and accompanying text.
12. Protocol I, supra note 8, arts. 48, 52(2).
13. See infra notes 134@35 and accompanying text.
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collateral civilian casualties by a requirement of proportional-
ity.14 This re'uirementO howeverO “can mean very different
things to different peopleK”15
These are but a few examples of the many indeterminacies in
the law of war. Indeterminacy in the law manifests in legal
norms that take the form of standards rather than rules. A rule
is a legal norm that is given content ex ante, while a standard is
a legal norm that is given content ex post.16 Louis Kaplow thus
explains:
[A] rule may entail an advance determination of what conduct
is permissible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator.
QA rule might prohibit “driving in excess of 55 miles per hour
on eSpresswaysK”P A standard may entail leaving both specifiL
cation of what conduct is permissible and factual issues for the
ad=udicatorK QA standard might prohibit “driving at an eScesL
sive speed on eSpresswaysK”PK17
Commentators have observed, however, the absence of pure
rules or standards,18 as “legal commands mix the two in varying
degrees.”19 Rather, the distinction between rules and standards
refers to “a continuum in which a norm may have more characL
teristics of a rule or a standardK”20
Indeterminacy in the law, that is, legislative choices to enact
standards rather than rules, has largely been explained with ref-
erence to legislative costs.21 Commentators have observed that
rules tend to be over- and under-inclusive in relation to their
purposes because an effort to give content to the law ex ante can-
not take into account the circumstances of each particular act to
14. Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(5)(b).
15. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 60.
16. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 559 (1992) (noting that “arguments about and definitions of rules and
standards commonly emphasize the distinction between whether the law is
given content ex ante or ex post.”).
17. Id. at 559@60.
18. Cohen, Rules and Standards, supra note 3, at 44 (observing that “there
exists no pure rule or standard.”).
19. Kaplow, supra note 16, at 561.
20. Cohen, Rules and Standards, supra note 3, at 44.
21. Kaplow, supra note 16, at 562 (“Rules are more costly to promulgate
than standards because rules involve advance determinations of the law’s con-
tent.”).
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which the norm applies.22 FenceO rules often “give inade'uate
consideration to case-specific contextual factors. Normally, hard
and fast rules, by striking a balance among competing values in
advance, produce results that are under- or over-protective of
one or another value in many individual circumstancesK”23
In view of over- and under-inclusiveness concerns, often the
only tenable alternative to the use of standards would be a com-
plex rule, as opposed to a simple one, which would address a
large number of contingencies pertaining to the lawfulness of a
particular conduct.24 The effort to explore ex ante a large number
of contingencies in the formation of a complex rule would not
completely resolve under- and over-inclusiveness concerns, but
may reduce them to a degree where they are not prohibitive of
the introduction of a rule.25 The cost of such an effort, however,
often makes legislators reluctant to opt for the promulgation of
rules.26
In the realm of the law of war, the legislative costs impediment
to the introduction of rules looms large. The question of whether
a balancing between the competing interests underlying the law
of war?military necessity, on one hand, and humanitarian in-
terests, on the other?ought to yield a norm of the law of war
that prohibits or requires a particular action often depends on a
large number of contingencies.
Consider the standard-like norm of the law of war requiring
that “effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which
22. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1695 (1976) (observing the “costs of mechanical over-and
underinclusion” attached to the application of rules.); William H. Simon, Le-
gality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1227
(1983) (observing that “rules are over- and under-inclusive in regard to their
purposes.”).
23. Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance
of the UN Charter Regime, 24 EUR. J.I.L. 151, 167@68 (2013).
24. Kaplow, supra note 16, at 565@66 (noting that the assertion that rules
are inherently over- and under-inclusive in comparison with standards ignores
the possibility of complex rules); Cohen, Rules and Standards, supra note 3, at
58 (noting that “rules can be complex too, and take into consideration many
factors.”).
25. Cohen, Rules and Standards, supra note 3, at 58 (observing that “no
legal norm is able to completely cover all contingencies, but complex rules may
cover most cases, if an attempt is made to do so.”).
26. Kaplow, supra note 16, at 595 (observing with regard to the legislation
of complex rules that, “[c]ase-by-case creations (and re-creations) of complex
formulas are expensive.”).
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may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not
permitK”27 Introducing the warning requirement as a rule rather
than as a standard requires addressing ex ante contingencies,
such as the degree of foreseeable impact on civilians that re-
quires a warning; the level of risk that a warning would compro-
mise the mission, which justifies an exemption from the obliga-
tion to provide a warning; the level of threat to the attacking
force resulting from the warning that justifies not giving it; the
level of specificity and clarity required of a warning; the amount
of time that must be given for evacuation; and the method by
which the warning is conveyed.28 Some of these aspects of the
warning requirement are dependent on a range of circumstances
that vary from one situation to the next.
The norms of the law of war are created mainly through mul-
tilateral international treaties. The legislative cost impediment
to the introduction of rules is compounded by the realities of
multilateral treaty negotiations, a legislative environment that
is least conducive to the exploration of a large number of contin-
gencies.29 The tendency of this international legislative process
to produce standards rather than rules has been explained by
“the need to accommodate the hodgepodge of values, interests,
and preferences of a large number of participants, the fear of
noncompliance by some participants, and the lack of immediate
and direct reciprocity among all.”30
The subject matter of the law of war further encumbers efforts
on the part of multilateral treaty negotiators to agree upon clear
rules, as negotiations touch upon the core national security in-
terests of states, as well as upon strong humanitarian convic-
tions, and are therefore likely to be contentious.31 The drafters
27. Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 57(2)(c).
28. Pnina Sharvit Baruch & Noam Neuman, Warning Civilians Prior to At-
tack Under International Law: Theory and Practice, 87 INT’LL. STUD. 359, 377@
92 (2011) (discussing the various elements of the “effective warning” require-
ment).
29. Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, supra note 3, at 350 (observing
that many scholars agree that multilateral treaty negotiations “tend to impose
open-ended, standard-setting obligations, rather than clear, specific rules.”).
30. Id.
31. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THEGENEVACONVENTIONS OF 12AUGUST 1949, at
xxxxiv (1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS] (ob-
serving with regard to the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Addi-
tional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, “though treaties of this nature
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of humanitarian law treaties have therefore intentionally opted
for the indeterminacy of standards32 as a compromise between
conflicting views.33 Indeterminacy in the law of war reflects the
broader “problem of large stakes”34 in international law, which
concerns the sensitivity of states to international law re-
strictions that involve the most pressing interests of the state,
including those implicated by war. Such sensitivity manifests
both in frequent failure to comply with existing restrictions and
in reluctance to accept new restrictions that are clear and une-
quivocal.35 State sensitivity to law of war restrictions is not uni-
form across the international community, as the prospects of in-
volvement in future armed conflicts vary from one state to the
next, which largely explains controversies arising during law of
war multilateral treaty negotiations.
Observing the cost of indeterminacy in international law,
Thomas Franck explained that “indeterminate normative standL
ards not only make it harder to know what conformity is ex-
pectedO but also make it easier to =ustify noncomplianceK”36 Such
noncompliance is based on manipulative interpretation of the
law:
Since few persons or states wish to be perceived as acting in
obvious violation of a generally recognized rule of conduct, they
may try to resolve the conflicts between the demands of a rule
and their desire not to be fetteredO by “interpreting” the rule
have humanitarian aims, their implementation raises political and military
problems, to begin with, that of the survival of the State. Thus it was not pos-
sible to escape this tension between political and humanitarian require-
ments.”).
32. Cohen, Legal Operational Advice, supra note 1, at 382 (observing that
the law of war “has been designed specifically as a system which leaves much
room for interpretation.”); id. at 389 (observing that the law of war is replete
with ambiguities, “many of which were intentional.”).
33. See, e.g., COMMENTARY ON THEADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 31, at
678, n. 3 (observing that Article 57 of the First Additional Protocol to the Ge-
neva Conventions, which requires belligerents to take precautions in attack,
“was a subject that required lengthy discussions and difficult negotiations in
the Diplomatic Conference, and the text which was finally agreed upon is the
fruit of laborious compromise between the various points of view.”).
34. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,
90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1883@85 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, A Compliance-
Based Theory of International Law].
35. See infra notes 86@90 and accompanying text.
36. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J.
INT’L L. 705, 714 (1988).
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permissively. A determinate rule is less elastic and thus less
amenable to such evasive strategy than an indeterminate
one.37
The amenability of indeterminate norms to manipulative in-
terpretation is exacerbated in the context of the international
legal system, which, notwithstanding the proliferation of inter-
national judicial and quasi-judicial entities engaged in the en-
forcement of international law, remains unstructured and lacks
a central adjudicative authority.38 Compared to domestic legal
systems, the decentralized nature of the international legal sys-
tem diminishes its capacity to provide authoritative meaning to
fleSible standardsO leaving states “free to rest on eStreme posiL
tions which tend to aggravate uncertainties still furtherK”39
Current indeterminacies in the law of war render this body of
law vastly amenable to manipulation by belligerent parties,
leaving them free to pursue an extremely permissive interpreta-
tion of the law, designed to align with military self-interest. As
one commentator notedO state officials “will define compliance in
instrumental terms that exploit the indeterminacy of interna-
tional law. Officials will strategically use imprecision and uncer-
tainty in international law to provide flexible interpretations
that meet the needs of particular circumstancesK”40 Although
37. Id. at 714.
38. Waxman, supra note 23, at 153 (noting that “for the most part . . . appli-
cation and enforcement of international law are decentralized, occur outside
formal international institutions, and remain largely the province of states.”).
39. Julius Stone, On the Vocation of the International Law Commission, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 16, 38 (1957). See alsoWaxman, supra note 23, at 176@77 (not-
ing that “[f]lexible standards may retain their objective content in domestic
law settings because there are mechanisms like courts for reviewing them and
providing authoritative meaning.” By contrast, “the international legal system
lacks formal adjudicative processes necessary to make flexible standards oper-
ate effectively. . . .”).
40. Rao, supra note 1, at 267. See also Roger Normand & Chris Jochnick,
The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 387, 413 (1994) (observing that “the Gulf War and other wars of this
century provide ample evidence that states can manipulate vague humanitar-
ian principles of the laws of war to shield their conduct from closer scrutiny.”);
Cohen, Legal Operational Advice, supra note 1, at 382 (observing the indeter-
minacy in the law of war, Cohen argues that “[s]enior military commanders
and other external bodies like the Ministry of Justice [of Israel] are aware of
this characteristic of [international humanitarian law], and exploit it to pro-
mote their positions.”).
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concerns that “fleSibility becomes manipulability”41 arise in re-
lation to every indeterminate norm, such concerns are com-
pounded when it comes to the law of war, given the pressing cir-
cumstances regulated by its norms and the high stakes in-
volved.42 Citing some of the ambiguities of the law of war, com-
mentators thus noted that “in the absence of either eSplicit
boundaries or an implicitly shared understanding, belligerents
would inevitably interpret these terms in the heat of battle to
suit their immediate military needsK”43 There is little doubt that
the opportunity to stretch the law of war to the permissive end
of a broad interpretative continuum, presented to states by the
indeterminacy in the law of war, has a devastating effect from a
humanitarian perspective. Indeterminacy in the law of war se-
verely diminishes its capacity to advance its paramount human-
itarian ob=ective of “alleviating as much as possible the calamiL
ties of warK”44
In the absence of a central adjudicative authority, interna-
tional law is largely enforced “through appraisal by individual
states and, to some extent, non-governmental and international
organizations that wield informal influence in shaping expecta-
tions and opinion among domestic and international audi-
encesK”45 The interaction between the decentralized structure of
the international legal system and the indeterminacy of the law
of war, which allows belligerent parties to invoke extremely per-
missive interpretations of the law, also grants broad interpretive
liberties to the various compliance agents assessing the legality
of a state’s military operationsK States and other international
actors may therefore reprimand a belligerent party for non-com-
pliance with the law of war based on a legal view that stretches
the law of war to the restrictive extreme of a broad interpretative
continuum, emanating from indeterminacy in the law. Such an
41. Waxman, supra note 23, at 179.
42. Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 163,
173 (2011) [hereinafter Blum, On a Differential Law of War].
43. Chris Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Crit-
ical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 74 (1994).
44. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 17 (2004) (“The paramount precept of the
[Law of International Armed Conflict]?to reiterate again the language of the
St Petersburg Declaration . . . is 0alleviating as much as possible the calamities
of war.’”).
45. Waxman, supra note 23, at 156.
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interpretive approach often reflects sincere humanitarian con-
victions, as many mechanisms for the enforcement of the law of
war, operated by states, international organizations, and NGOs,
“feed onO and intoO a growing Western-liberal humanitarian con-
sciousness, which loathes war in principle and holds the human-
itarian functions of the laws of war in high regardK”46 A restric-
tive interpretation of the law of war may also be invoked by third
states as a vehicle for the advancement of far less noble foreign
policy interests.47 When such interpretation is directed by com-
pliance agents against one of the belligerent parties for the ben-
efit of the otherO it amounts to “lawfareO” defined as “the strategy
of using?or misusing?law as a substitute for traditional mili-
tary means to achieve an operational ob=ectiveK”48
Hence, there is no guarantee that a choice by a belligerent
party to cede an extremely permissive interpretation of the law
of war for the sake of a more moderate one would shield it from
the adverse consequences of non-compliance with international
law, inflicted upon the belligerent party by various compliance
agents. The interpretative liberties of the various compliance
agents responding to the actions of belligerent parties provide
little incentive for the latter to refrain from taking full ad-
vantage themselves of indeterminacies in the law of war.
Moreover, indeterminacy in the law of war exacerbates the al-
ready pressing problem of inequality in the enforcement of in-
ternational law, as it augments the liberty of states acting as
compliance agents to align their interpretations of the law with
self-serving foreign policy considerations concerning the bellig-
erency at hand.49 Such arbitrary enforcement undermines the
46. Blum, On a Differential Law of War, supra note 42, at 174.
47. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47
VA. J. INT’L L. 149, 191 (2006) (cautioning against the application of universal
jurisdiction to war crimes because the vagueness of the laws of war makes “war
crimes allegations and prosecutions vulnerable to massage by politically moti-
vated states for purely sensationalist or propagandist, rather than legal, in-
centives.”).
48. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT’L
AFF. 146, 146 (2008).
49. Colangelo, supra note 47, at 191; Waxman, supra note 23, at 174 (ob-
serving that lawyers advocating greater determinacy in the law regarding re-
sort to force “contend that any flexible discretion will result in arbitrary or
unjust enforcement that discredits law. In their view, clear rules help to pre-
vent phony or unprincipled enforcement, because they are more difficult for
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legitimacy of the law and may further encourage belligerent par-
ties to exploit indeterminacies in the law to advance their mili-
tary interests.
The adverse effect that indeterminacies in the law of war have
on compliance with international law transcends the purview of
each ambiguity; it extends to long-term compliance habits and
the integrity of state mechanisms for compliance with interna-
tional law, comprised of military lawyers and other government
legal advisors. Subscribing to the view that “the laws of war are
often written in vague terms, and are subject to different inter-
pretationsO”50 Neomi Rao cautions that instead of developing
habits of robust complianceO “government officials may internalL
ize a habit of flexible or instrumental compliance?they will fig-
ure out how to make their preferred policies compliant with in-
ternational lawK”51
II. THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY REGIME
Indeterminacy in the law of war may be allayed through an
optional bargain between each state and the SC. In this pro-
posed model, the SC would provide incentives for states to cede
the advantages they derive from the indeterminacy of the law of
war by subscribing to an international advisory regime. Partici-
pating states would undertake to follow the interpretation of the
law of war laid out by international legal advisors. This Part will
discuss the basic terms of the bargain underlying the proposed
advisory regime. The terms concern the interpretive approach
dominating the interpretation of the law of war by the interna-
tional advisors, the benefits that the advisory regime holds for
statesO and the “soft law” nature of the obligations undertaken
by states in subscribing to the advisory regime. In view of con-
siderations of political feasibility, this Part will also suggest that
the right to subscribe to the advisory regime be restricted to
states.
strong states to pervert in pursuit of their own national interests.” This argu-
ment seems to apply to indeterminacy in the law of war as well).
50. Rao, supra note 1, at 241.
51. Id. at 260.
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A. The Advisory Regime and the Interpretive Continuum of the
Law of War
The bargain underlying the advisory regime would not take
the form of an agreement between the SC and the states that
subscribe to this regime regarding the content of particular
norms of the law of war. Rather, it would focus on the selection
of a general interpretive approach to the law of war that would
guide the interpretive efforts of the advisors. Under the proposed
advisory regimeO abiding by the advisors’ interpretation of the
law of war would secure for a state a comprehensive protection
from enforcement measures undertaken by various interna-
tional law compliance agents, as well as the reputational and
legitimacy benefits attached to compliance with the law of war.
The appeal of the advisory regime from a humanitarian per-
spective, and its political feasibility in terms of its appeal for the
various states, depend on the nature of the general interpretive
approach that would dominate the work of the international ad-
visors. A quest for an objective interpretation of the law of war
would be futile because indeterminacy renders it “susceptible to
systematically inconsistent interpretationsK”52 Commentators
have pointed to two competing interpretive approaches to the
law of warO which Zavid Cuban termed “the Caw of Armed ConL
flict vision” Q“CoAC vision”P versus “the International FumaniL
tarian Caw vision” Q“IFC vision”PK53 These terms are used in the
52. David Luban, Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law, 26
LEIDEN J.I.L. 315, 321 (2013). See also Rao, supra note 1, at 203 (discussing
how indeterminacies in the law of war allow “for a range of plausible or defen-
sible interpretations.”).
53. Luban, supra note 52, at 315@16. Similarly, Eyal Benvenisti points to a
“cleavage between two visions of the law [of war?A.Z.].” Eyal Benvenisti, Hu-
man Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV.
81, 82 (2006). Benvenisti elaborates:
The Urst visionO espoused by governments and armies K K K
views the laws of war primarily as a compact between rival
armies to coordinate how they can 0conciliate the necessities
of war with the laws of humanityK’ The second visionO
reTected in recent decisions of international tribunals and in
articulations of humanitarian organizations, reads the law as
a manifest of humanitarian fraternity, and their role as its
promoters. . . . This internal tension within the jus in bello is
captured by its two contemporary appellations: the more in-
spirational and prevalent 0International Fumanitarian Caw’
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present article as well. Both visions accept the basic, standard-
like norms of the law of war (e.g., the principles of distinction,
precaution, proportionality, and humanity), but they reach dif-
ferent conclusions in their application, as they assign the com-
peting interests underlying the law of war, military necessity
and human dignityO “different logical priorityK”54
The LoAC vision begins with the assumption that the exist-
ence of armed conflict fundamentally transforms the regulation
by the law of state conductK FenceO the CoAC vision “assigns milL
itary necessity and the imperatives of war-making primary, ax-
iomatic status. In this vision, the legal regulation of warfare con-
sists of adjustments around the margins of war to mitigate its
horrorsK”55 Notwithstanding the importance of this function of
the law of warO “it is logically secondaryO and it yields to the force
majeure of military necessityK”56 By contrastO “WtVhe IHL vision
begins with humanitarianism, and assigns human dignity and
human rights primary statusK”57 Underlying this perception is
contempt for the phenomenon of war. According to the IHL vi-
sion, the perception of war as a human failure cannot be recon-
ciled with prioritizing military necessity, and by extension, war
itself, over humanitarian values.58 Luban observed that:
Where legal restrictions operate in the margins of military ne-
cessity under the LOAC vision, IHL strains to relegate war to
the margins of peacetime rights. As a result, its mode of legal
interpretation is maximalist in just those places?the re-
straints and obligations of warriors?where LOAC is minimal-
ist, and minimalist in the places where LOAC is maximalist: in
discretion and deference to the military.59
and the more neutral 0Caw on InternationalJBon-Interna-
tional Armed ConTictK’
Id. at 82@83.
54. Luban, supra note 52, at 329.
55. Id. at 316.
56. Id.
57. Id. See also Benvenisti, supra note 53, at 82@83 (observing that the IHL
vision “highlights the overriding and unconditional humanitarian obligation
toward civilians regardless of their nationality.”).
58. Luban, supra note 52, at 316 (noting that the IHL vision “regards war
as a human failure . . . not something that deserves legal priority over the
protection of rights and dignity.”).
59. Id. at 329.
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Yet, the interpretive approaches of the purist LoAC vision and
of the purist IHL vision?the former consistently adhering to the
most permissive interpretation of the norms of the law of war
plausible under the indeterminacy of the law, and the latter con-
sistently adhering to the most restrictive interpretation?do not
represent a dichotomy that accounts for all law of war jurists.60
Rather, these visions of the law of war represent the ends of a
continuum of possible interpretive approaches: the law of war
interpretive continuum. Although these visions reflect the views
of many law of war jurists, many others do not adhere to an ex-
treme interpretive approach that consistently favors either the
maximization of restrictions and minimization of military dis-
cretion, or the opposite. The difference between the views of
some lawyers whose interpretive approach can roughly be de-
scribed as leaning toward the LoAC vision and of those who ad-
here to an interpretive approach that is somewhat closer to the
IHL vision may be moderate. The selection of an interpretive ap-
proach to the law of war must therefore be determined by refer-
ence to the law of war interpretive continuum, bounded by the
permissive LoAC vision at the one end, and by the restrictive
IHL vision at the other.
This article proposes an advisory regime that represents the
best politically feasible bargain from a humanitarian perspec-
tive, based on the selection of an interpretive approach that
would prevail under the proposed regime. Such an interpretive
approach must not stray from the IHL vision toward the LoAC
vision more than is necessary to maintain the appeal of the ad-
visory regime from the states’ point of viewK Hor statesO the curL
rent indeterminacy in the law of war provides an opportunity to
invoke extremely permissive interpretations of the law of war
that conform to their military interests. To fully preserve this
advantage, the advisory regime would have to adhere to the pur-
ist LoAC vision. Although the proposed advisory regime would
stray from this vision, states would have an incentive to sub-
scribe to this regime because the broad interpretive liberties re-
sulting from indeterminacy in the law of war are available also
to the various compliance agents assessing the legality of mili-
tary operations. Such interpretive liberties may result in the
treatment of a state by various compliance agents as a violator
of the law of war based on an interpretive approach that either
60. Id. at 316.
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approximates or leans toward the restrictive IHL vision, even if
the actions of the state would be considered lawful under an in-
terpretation of the law that is not extremely permissive. Sub-
scribing to the proposed advisory regime, an operating state
would cede its own interpretive liberties in order to reduce its
vulnerability to those of various compliance agents.
Assessing how much a state would be willing to concede in the
interpretive approach to the law of war that would prevail under
the advisory regime essentially raises a question of compliance.
To what extent would a state be willing to restrain its military
operations to avoid the costs associated with being perceived by
various compliance agents as having violated the law of war?
The international law and international relations literature of-
fers several competing compliance theories concerning the effect
that international legal norms have on the conduct of states.61
The present inquiry follows instrumentalist compliance theo-
ries, which maintain that states comply with international law
only when doing so serves their self-interestO namelyO “when the
total benefits of doing so outweigh the costsK”62
The appeal of the proposed advisory regime for states depends
on a cost-benefit analysis that corresponds to that which deter-
mines whether states comply with international law. The benefit
that the advisory regime offers to states lies in the protection it
provides against the damage associated with the perception by
various compliance agents that the state violated the law of war.
The cost for a state of subscribing to the advisory regime is ex-
pressed by the gap, along the interpretive continuum of the law
of war, between the interpretive approach of the purist LoAC
vision, which represents the maximum amount of liberties that
a state may reasonably assert in its military operations relying
on the indeterminacy in the law, and the interpretive approach
61. See Steven R. Ratner, Does International LawMatter in Preventing Eth-
nic Conflict, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’LL.&POL. 591, 647@51 (2000) (reviewing the var-
ious compliance theories).
62. Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J.
INT’LL. 115, 138 (2005) [hereinafter Guzman, Saving Customary International
Law]. Guzman further observes, “international law (customary or otherwise)
offers some 0compliance pull,’ encouraging states to obey the law. A state will
not violate a norm of customary international law if that violation would gen-
erate gains smaller than its costs.” Id. See also JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A.
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (2005) (noting that instrumen-
talist compliance theories hold that “states comply with treaties when it is in
their rational self-interest to do so, and not otherwise.”).
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followed by the international advisors. The costs and benefits of
the advisory regime for a state cannot be neatly separated from
each other, as the value of the protections available under the
advisory regime can only be measured in relation to the norma-
tive path a state must follow to secure these protections. This
Part now turns to review the benefits that the advisory regime
holds for states.
B. The Benefits of the Advisory Regime for States
Instrumentalist theorists observed that the costs of violating
an international norm, bearing on the conduct of states, consist
of direct sanctions and reputational costs.63Direct sanctions con-
cern “specific punishments meted out by other states in response
to a violationK”64 Reputational costs are of two types. The first
concerns reputation for compliance with international law obli-
gations, which affects the future range of opportunities for inter-
national cooperation available to the state.65 If a state lacks good
reputation for compliance with its international obligations,
“other states will not want to enter into cooperative agreements
[with that state] that provide joint gains because of the possibil-
ity of opportunistic defectionK”66 The second type of reputational
costs emanating from non-compliance with international law
concerns the “global standing”67 of the state in terms of the “popL
ular perception of the state with a global audienceK”68
The benefits that the advisory regime offers to states corre-
spond to the costs they incur for non-compliance with the law of
war. The advisory regime would offer states and individuals act-
ing on their behalf comprehensive protections, grounded in the
exercise by the SC of its binding powers under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, against adjudicative enforcement measures,
63. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, supra note 62, at 134.
64. Id.
65. Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J.
231, 236 (2009).
66. Id. at 236@37. See also Guzman, Saving Customary International Law,
supra note 62, at 135 (noting that “if the reputational harm affects expectations
about compliance with international agreements, it will also be more difficult
for the violating state to enter into such agreements in the future.”).
67. Brewster, supra note 65, at 238 (noting that “it is important to differen-
tiate between what we popularly think of as the global standing of the state (or
global public opinion) and the state’s reputation for compliance with interna-
tional law.”).
68. Id. at 240.
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insofar as the state follows the legal guidance provided by the
international advisors. In the sphere of criminal law, such pro-
tections would preclude criminal proceedings against the agents
of the state (i.e., members of the armed forces of the state and
their political superiors) before any international court or for-
eign national court, regardless of the basis for jurisdiction in-
voked by such national court. The terms of the advisory regime
would also preclude non-criminal adjudicative measures pur-
sued by various compliance agents. The International Court of
Justice (ICJ) has recently construed customary international
law to grant a state complete immunity from civil claims brought
against the state before the courts of other states in relation to
the conduct of its armed forces in the course of armed conflict.69
The advisory regime would afford a state that follows the legal
guidance provided by the international advisors protections
against adjudication by international courts of claims against
the state arising from the armed conflict in question. In addition,
it would protect the agents of the state against civil proceedings
before foreign national courts if such proceedings are not already
precluded under the principle of foreign state immunity.70
The advisory regime would also significantly reduce the likeli-
hood that a state that subscribed to this regime would be subject
to economic sanctions imposed in response to its military opera-
tions.71 Economic sanctions against a state consist of the denial
of foreign economic assistance or trade benefits aimed at induc-
ing the state to change its internal or external policies.72 Eco-
nomic sanctions may be imposed by the SC in the exercise of its
69. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. Italy, Greece Interven-
ing), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 143, ¶¶ 77@78 (Feb. 3).
70. The principle of foreign state immunity grants a state immunity from
civil claims brought against the state before the courts of other states, subject
to certain exceptions. See generally Jurisdictional Immunities of the State
(Ger. v. Italy, Greece Intervening), 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 143, ¶¶ 55@61 (Feb. 3). This
immunity generally extends to agents of the state. National courts disagree,
however, on whether the agents of a state enjoy immunity before foreign na-
tional courts also with regard to civil claims alleging violation of jus cogens
norms. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
71. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
72. Michael Reisman has defined economic sanctions as follows:
Economic sanctions may take many forms and may be ap-
plied unilaterally or multilaterally, but like all uses of the
economic instrument, they involve the purposive threat or ac-
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authority under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter to take coercive
non-military measures that are necessary for the maintenance
of international peace and security.73 States may employ eco-
nomic sanctions against another state also in the absence of SC
guidance in order to promote their own foreign policy interests74
Q“unilateral economic sanctions”PK Although unilateral economic
sanctions are decentralized and not guided by SC action, they
often “form part of a broad network of K K K concerted transnaL
tional efforts”75 on the part of several states.
The SC resolution establishing the advisory regime would as-
sure states that in considering whether the military operations
of an operating state warrant the exercise by the SC of its powers
under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, the SC would take into
account the content of the legal guidance provided to the state
by the international advisors. The SC would also include, within
the resolution establishing the advisory regime, a non-binding
clause requesting states to refrain from imposing unilateral eco-
nomic sanctions aimed at promoting humanitarian interests on
an operating state. States would be urged to exercise such re-
straint as long as, according to the international advisors, the
conduct of the operating state demonstrates sufficient respect
for the advisory regime to justify the continued application of
this regime.76 Part IV below demonstrates that, although SC ac-
tion restricting the freedom of states to impose unilateral eco-
nomic sanctions would represent a problematic interference
with state sovereignty, the exercise by the SC of its non-binding
powers could go a long way to dissuade Western economic pow-
ers from resorting to such sanctions.
tual granting or withholding of economic indulgences, oppor-
tunities, and benefits by one actor or group of actors in order
to induce another actor or group of actors to change or adjust
an internal or external policy.
W. Michael Reisman, When are Economic Sanctions Effective? Selected Theo-
rems and Corollaries, 2 ILSA J. INT’L&COMP. L. 587, 587 (1995@1996).
73. U.N. Charter, art. 41.
74. Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanc-
tions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 4@5 (2001).
75. Id. at 8.
76. The grounds for the termination by the international advisors of a
state’s participation in the advisory regime are specified in Part III.F. below.
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The benefits of the advisory regime for states would transcend
protections against enforcement measures and extend to the op-
portunity to secure the reputational and legitimacy benefits at-
tached to compliance with the law of war. A stamp of legality
provided by the advisory regime for a state’s military operations
would go a long way to ensure that such operations do not dam-
age the reputation of the state for compliance with international
law. More importantly, such a stamp of legality would confer le-
gitimacy on the military operations of the state and ensure that
such operations do not harm the popular perception of the state
with a global audience. David Kennedy observed that “law has
become a mark of legitimacy?and legitimacy has become the
currency of powerK”77 Compliance with the law is intuitively per-
ceived as an independent moral good.78A stamp of legality there-
fore gives military operations “a humanitarian cover that helps
shield them from criticismK”79 This legitimizing effect reduces
the political costs for a state of military operations in terms of
foreign relations and of public opinion at home and abroad.
FenceO “law is a strategic partner for military commanders when
it increases the perception of outsiders that what the military is
doing is legitimateK”80
C. The Interpretive Approach to the Law of War Under the
Advisory Regime
In return for the benefits gained under the advisory regime,
states would submit to an interpretive approach that deviates
from the purist LoAC vision. The bargain underlying the advi-
sory regime would allow the SC to leverage the potential non-
compliance costs for a state resulting from current indetermi-
nacy in the law in a manner that increases the effect of such
costs on state conduct. The effectiveness of such potential costs
in influencing state conduct is currently diminished by a gap be-
77. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 45.
78. See Jochnick & Normand, supra note 43, at 57 (observing that “because
people generally view compliance with 0the law’ as an independent good, acts
are validated by simply being legal. In particular, sovereign conduct that com-
plies with the law will appear more legitimate than that which violates it.”).
79. Id. at 56. See also KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 116 (observing that the
legal vocabulary has been “promoted as a universal vernacular for evaluating
the political legitimacy of military action.”).
80. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 41.
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tween the most a state is willing to concede in accepting re-
straints on its military efforts in order to avoid these costs, and
the interpretive views of various compliance agents, which are
far more restrictive of the liberties of belligerents in the conduct
of military operations. As a result of this gap, the potential non-
compliance costs for a state arising from the interpretive views
of such compliance agents are wasted as a leverage for influenc-
ing the conduct of the state. The incentive for a state to renounce
an extremely permissive interpretation of the law of war for the
sake of a more moderate one is diminished if such concession
does not suffice to relieve the state of non-compliance costs re-
sulting from the legal perceptions prevailing in large parts of the
international community. The proposed advisory regime would
enable the international community, acting through the SC, to
bring the full weight of the potential non-compliance costs to
bear as leverage employed by the SC in shaping a bargain with
potential operating states regarding the selection of an interpre-
tive approach to the law of war.
The effort to delineate the contours of an advisory regime that
represents the best politically feasible bargain from a humani-
tarian perspective can relate only to a generic state, and there-
fore cannot address cost-benefit considerations that vary from
one state to another. For example, the value attributed by a state
to the protections provided by the advisory regime against legal
and economic enforcement measures, undertaken by various
compliance agents, depends on the extent of vulnerability of the
state and of its agents to such measures, which in turn depends
on the realities of power in the international arena.81 Similarly,
the legitimizing effect that a stamp of legality provided by the
advisory regime has on the military operations of a state varies
from one state to another and depends, amongst other things, on
the views of the international community regarding the broader
context of the conflict. The reputational costs of a law of war vi-
olation also vary from one state to another,82 while the evalua-
tion by governments of such costs depends on domestic political
81. See, e.g., Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,
supra note 34, at 1868@69 (observing that the willingness of a state to impose
sanctions on another state for the violation of international law depends,
among others, on “the relative power of the two countries.”).
82. See Brewster, supra note 65, at 244 (observing, with regard to a state’s
reputation for compliance with international law, that “[r]eputational losses
are also not equally effective for all states and in all strategic situations, . . .
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circumstances, such as the nature of the regime and the ex-
pected length of tenure of the government.83 The military costs
for a state that are likely to attach to compliance with the legal
guidance provided under the advisory regime depend on the mil-
itary capabilities of each state.84 It was observed that “once com-
pliance becomes impossible without excessive risk or costs to a
party’s own war effortsO the rules are bound to be ignoredK”85
Therefore, the appeal for states of any particular bargain offered
by the proposed advisory regime would vary from one state to
another.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of determining the terms of the
advisory regime by reference to a generic state, it is possible to
identify an interpretive approach to the law of war that, together
with the benefits available to states under the advisory regime,
would form an incentive structure that is likely to induce a large
number of states to subscribe to this regime, while also approxi-
mating the best bargain from a humanitarian perspective that
these states would be willing to strike. The quest for such an
interpretive approach is guided by two considerations. The first
concerns the recognition that an armed conflict involves the
most pressing interests of a stateK Addressing “the problem of
large stakes”86 in the application of international law, Andrew
Guzman has observed:
International law will have the smallest impact in those areas
of greatest importance to countries. This observation suggests
that many of the most central topics in traditional interna-
tional law scholarship are the most resistant to influence.
Thus, for example, the laws of war, territorial limits (including
[R]eputational sanctions are not necessarily effective against states with sig-
nificant power in certain issue areas.”).
83. See id. at 254 (observing that “reputational analysis is highly contingent
on domestic politics.”). Citing allegations that the treatment of detainees by
the United States violated international law, Brewster notes that “the Bush
administration might not fully internalize the reputational costs to the United
States of its decision to violate international law because the administration is
in office for a limited period of time.” Id. at 232.
84. See, e.g., Blum, On a Differential Law of War, supra note 42, at 171 (ob-
serving that “existing legal constraints make lawful fighting much easier for
the powerful than for the weak.”).
85. Id. at 172.
86. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, supra note
34, at 1883.
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territorial seas), neutrality, arms agreements, and military al-
liances are among the areas least likely to be affected by inter-
national law.87
One aspect of the diminished capacity of international law to
influence the war effort of a state concerns outright violations of
the law. It was noted that “WoVf all possible spheres of internaL
tional regulation, war seems to be the most challenging in terms
of ensuring compliance with restraintsK”88 The problem of non-
compliance is exceptionally severe when it comes to the law of
warO in part because “the compliance pull of international law
will be the weakest when the stakes at issue are large.”89
The problem of large stakes, arising in relation to the law of
war, is not restricted to non-compliance with current legal re-
straints, as it also includes the reluctance of states to accept ad-
ditional ones. The exceptional sensitivity of states to restraints
on their war effort partially explains the high extent of indeter-
minacy in the law of war, produced by multilateral treaty nego-
tiations.90 This sensitivity also affects the terms of a politically
feasible advisory regime that requires states to renounce the ad-
vantages that indeterminacy in the law provides. Because an
armed conflict involves their most pressing interests, states are
not likely to subscribe to a compliance regime that is dominated
by an interpretive approach closer to the restrictive IHL vision
than to the permissive LoAC vision.
The second consideration concerns the assessment by states of
the non-compliance costs that may result from their subscription
to the advisory regime. The advisory regime would remove mili-
tary operations inconsistent with the legal guidance provided
under this regime from the realm of indeterminacy in the law,
painting them as outright violations of the law of war. Currently,
a state acting based on a permissive interpretation of the law of
war, made plausible by indeterminacy in the law, may be treated
87. Id. at 1885.
88. Blum, On a Differential Law of War, supra note 42, at 173.
89. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, supra note
34, at 1883. See also Waxman, supra note 23, at 177 (noting that “compliance
is probably especially difficult . . . to promote with respect to force because it
implicates states’ core national security interests.”).
90. Cassese, supra note 1, at 341 (noting that the law of war is vague partly
because “states, in particular major powers, have demonstrated themselves
prepared to leave these standards as loose as possible, in order to retain a
broad margin of manoeuver when engaged in combat.”).
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as a violator of international law by compliance agents that ad-
here to a more restrictive interpretation of the law. But the
boundary between the realm of indeterminacy in the law and
outright violations of international law (i.e., conduct that cannot
be justified on the basis of any plausible interpretation of the
law) is significant when it comes to the non-compliance costs of
the conduct in question.91 Crossing the line between the exploi-
tation of indeterminacy in the law and an outright violation does
not merely add to the number of compliance agents that view the
conduct as a violation of the law, but it involves a qualitative
leap in potential non-compliance costs. An obvious violation of
the law of war may induce various compliance agents to resort
to enforcement measures that are far harsher than those pur-
sued against a state that can rely on an indeterminate norm, and
mobilize several compliance agents to coordinate enforcement
measures directed against the violating state.92 Therefore, a de-
cision by the international advisors that a particular military
operation of the state, which is currently allowed under some
plausible interpretations of the law and prohibited under others,
violates the law of war would result in non-compliance costs for
the state that outweigh the benefits for the state emanating from
a determination by the advisors that the operation in question
is lawful.
Because the political feasibility of the proposed advisory re-
gime depends on its appeal for states under a cost-benefit anal-
ysis, the interpretive approach employed by the advisors must
compensate for the gap between the potential costs and potential
benefits for a state of any particular decision by the advisors con-
cerning the legality of a military operation. This requires that
the advisors use an interpretive approach that is closer to the
purist LoAC vision than to the purist IHL vision.
91. Franck, supra note 36, at 714 (observing the significance for states of
not being “perceived as acting in obvious violation of a generally recognized
rule of conduct,” hence the appeal for states of promoting stretched interpreta-
tions of the law in reliance of its indeterminacy).
92. Waxman, supra note 23, at 172@73 (noting that the argument for deter-
minate norms of international law is premised on the assumption that “much
enforcement of international law regarding force depends on the costs (politi-
cal, military, economic, etc.) that other states and international actors impose
on law-breakers, based in part on their own legal appraisal” and that, there-
fore, “determinacy?that is, the ability to generate understanding of what the
law permits and what it does not?is a critical element of enforcement. . . .”).
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The above analysis outlines the contours of an interpretive ap-
proach to the law of war that would make the proposed advisory
regime the best bargain from a humanitarian perspective that is
politically feasible. The advisory regime should be dominated by
an interpretive approach that does not represent the purist
LoAC vision at the permissive end of the law of war interpretive
continuum, that is, an approach that does not consistently ad-
here to the most permissive interpretation of the norms of the
law of war plausible under the indeterminacy of the law. But
along the law of war interpretive continuum, the interpretive
approach that would prevail under the advisory regime would be
closer to the purist LoAC vision than to the purist IHL vision.
Cet us call this interpretive approach the “moderate CoAC viL
sionK” Such a normative path would be securedO not through limL
itations imposed on the interpretive discretion of the advisors,
but rather through the process of selection of the international
advisors, tailored to ensure that the advisors selected are dis-
posed to embrace the moderate LoAC vision.
Applying an instrumentalist approach to compliance, this ar-
ticle presupposes a generic state that views any restraint on its
military operations brought about by the advisory regime as the
costs of such regime. More often than not, this assumption has
merit also with regard to states that, acting as compliance
agents in response to the conduct of other states, advance an
ambitious humanitarian agenda manifested in an interpretive
approach that leans toward the IHL vision. To the extent that
such states are involved in an armed conflict or might conceiva-
bly be parties to such conflict in the foreseeable future, they are
not likely to subject themselves to the same legal restraints that
they advocate as compliance agents.93 Yet, states that are ideo-
logically committed to an interpretive approach toward the law
of war that approximates or leans toward the IHL vision would
be free to subscribe to an advisory regime that follows such an
approach.
93. David Kretzmer, The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality
in jus ad bellum, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 235, 238 (2013) (addressing the right of
states to use force, Kretzmer observed, “states that are themselves faced with
armed attacks or threats of such attacks are inevitably going to have a differ-
ent perspective from uninvolved states. The perspective of the latter is likely
to change radically once they too are faced with an attack.” This observation
seems relevant also with regard to jus in bello).
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D. Non-State Parties to an Armed Conflict
The right to subscribe to the advisory regime would be re-
stricted to states. Excluding non-state parties to an armed con-
flict from the advisory regime would place a significant limita-
tion on the sway of this regime as a vehicle for enhancing com-
pliance with the law of war. But the fundamental position of the
international community of states toward non-state parties to
an armed conflict does not accommodate applying the incentive
structure of the advisory regime to such parties.
The law of war generally denies prisoner of war status to mem-
bers of non-state parties to an armed conflict, allowing their
prosecution by states also for acts of violence that are lawful un-
der the law of war.94 It was thus observed that “the law K K K finds
itself in a somewhat paradoxical position of purporting to guide
the actions of those whose actions are inherently unlawfulK”95
The refusal of the international community to grant non-state
belligerents immunity for acts of violence that are in compliance
with the law of war cannot be reconciled with the protection
against criminal prosecution that the advisory regime offers in
return for compliance with the legal guidance provided by the
international advisors.
Moreover, states are careful to make sure that the law of war
does not manifest in any way that politically benefits non-state
actors that are parties to a non-international armed conflict. For
eSampleO the term “combatants” has not been introduced to
treaty law regulating non-international armed conflict partly be-
cause of concern on the part of states that conferring such title
upon members of armed groups engaged in an armed conflict
with a state would grant such groups a measure of legitimacy.96
This suggests that the bulk of the international community
would oppose non-state actors subscribing to the advisory re-
gime, not least because of the legitimacy and reputational bene-
fits that would attach to the stamp of legality provided to the
actions of a warring party under this regime.
94. David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judi-
cial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EURO. J. INT’L L. 171, 197
(2005) [hereinafter Kretzmer, Targeted Killing].
95. Blum, On a Differential Law of War, supra note 42, at 201.
96. Kretzmer, Targeted Killing, supra note 94, at 197.
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E. The Soft Law Nature of the Obligations Undertaken by
Operating States
The proposed advisory regime is based on voluntary state par-
ticipation, motivated by a cost-benefit analysis. A state would be
able to subscribe to the proposed advisory regime by pronounc-
ing its intention to act in accordance with the international ad-
visors’ interpretation of the law of war and to cooperate other-
wise with the advisors in accordance with the guidelines for the
operation of the advisory mechanism set forth by the SC. This
pronouncement on the part of the state would take the form of a
non-binding declaration. This type of declaration is often char-
acteriRed in the legal literature as “soft lawO” a concept that enL
compasses “non-binding norms, such as political or moral obli-
gations, adopted by statesO”97 in the form of “political declara-
tions, unilateral statements by political authorities, non-binding
resolutions, recommendations, and decisions adopted by inter-
governmental bodiesK”98
Commentators have noted that “WtVhe key distinction between
hard and soft law is that the former imposes greater costs on the
violating state than does the latterK”99 Hence, the prospects of
inducing a state to enter an obligation in the international arena
often depend on the non-binding nature of such obligation.100 Al-
lowing states to subscribe to the advisory regime by undertaking
a soft law obligation would enhance the political feasibility of
this regime.
The non-binding nature of a state’s obligations under the proL
posed advisory regime does not detract from the binding nature
of the norms of the law of war themselves.101 But in and of itself,
a failure by an operating state to follow the legal guidance pro-
vided by the international advisors would not, by virtue of the
97. Jaye Ellis, Shades of Grey: Soft Law and the Validity of Public Interna-
tional Law, 25 LEIDEN J.I.L. 313, 315 (2012).
98. Id. at 319.
99. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 177 (2010). See also Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delega-
tion, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 888, 911 (2009) (noting that “while states can al-
ways choose to ignore international law, the essence of soft law is that the cost
of reneging is less when an obligation is soft rather than when it is hard.”).
100. VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (2007) (explaining soft law in
that “[s]tates are naturally reluctant to sign up to binding legal instruments.”).
101. Guzman & Meyer, supra note 99, at 174 (distinguishing between bind-
ing legal norms and soft law obligations regarding the interpretation of the
binding norms).
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state subscribing to the advisory regime, constitute a violation
of international law. The soft law obligations of an operating
state under the advisory regime would not present a legal hurdle
for the state to advance any interpretation of the law of war in
the course of any national or international adjudicative proceed-
ing. Furthermore, no adjudicative authority would be bound by
the interpretation of the law laid out by the international advi-
sors.
Yet, soft law typically has a significant effect on the conduct of
statesK The soft law obligations of a state “form part of the
broader normative context within which expectations of what is
reasonable or proper State behavior are formedK”102 A non-bind-
ing promise by a state to follow a certain interpretation of a bind-
ing norm promotes the perception among other states that con-
duct by the promising state that does not comply with such in-
terpretation also violates the underlying binding norm.103 Thus,
a non-binding obligation undertaken by an operating state to fol-
low the legal guidance provided by the international advisors
would increase the likelihood that other states view conduct on
the part of the operating state that is inconsistent with such
guidance as a violation of the law of war and resort to enforce-
ment measures against that state. Similarly, the undertaking by
an operating state of a non-binding obligation to follow the legal
guidance of the international advisors would increase the likeli-
hood that conduct that departs from such guidance would exact
reputational costs for the state, as it would, in the eyes of the
international community, diminish the credibility of a claim by
the operating state that the conduct in question complies with
the law of war.
Furthermore, a certain level of non-compliance by an operat-
ing state with its soft law obligations under the advisory regime
would constitute grounds for terminating the regime in relation
to that state.104 The bargain underlying the advisory regime, and
102. LOWE, supra note 100, at 95@96.
103. Guzman & Meyer, supra note 99, at 174@75 (observing that “legal texts
are often imprecise and ambiguous, and thus reasonable minds may differ over
what a legal obligation requires,” but “because obligations depend on the per-
ceptions of other states, nonbinding promises by states may create expecta-
tions about what constitutes appropriate behavior.” Non-binding promises
made by states regarding the interpretation of binding norms thus “have legal
consequences because they shape states’ expectations as to what constitutes
compliant behavior.”).
104. See infra Part III.F.
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the interest the operating state has in maintaining that bargain,
would transcend the circumstances of a particular military op-
eration and extend to the entire war effort of the state. The po-
tential costs for an operating state of any given deviation from
the legal guidance provided by the international advisors extend
beyond the consequences of concrete enforcement measures and
the reputational costs incurred in relation to the military opera-
tion at hand, and include the possible termination of the advi-
sory regime as a whole.105 Therefore, the incentives that would
induce a state initially to subscribe to the advisory regime would
also apply to enhance the compliance pull of the non-binding ob-
ligations undertaken by it.
The appeal of the advisory regime for operating states, mani-
fest in the initial decision to subscribe to this regime, also sug-
gests that the sway of the advisory regime in enhancing compli-
ance with the law of war extends beyond the problem of indeter-
minacy in the law. The evaluation by states of the costs of a par-
ticular violation of an international law obligation also extends
to the interest the state has in maintaining an international nor-
mative framework that benefits the state in the long term.106
Hence, the incentive structure that draws states to subscribe to
the advisory regime, and the link between the continued appli-
cation of that regime and compliance on the part of operating
states with the legal guidance provided by the international ad-
visors, enhance the compliance pull of the law of war in general.
III. THE SELECTION OF INTERNATIONAL ADVISORS AND THEIR
GUIDANCE ANDOVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS
This Part will describe the criteria and process for the selection
of international advisors. It will also elaborate on the form of the
legal guidance provided by the international advisors to operat-
ing states, and delineate the framework for a process of post
facto review by the advisors of the legality of the military actions
of an operating state. Finally, this Part will stipulate the
105. See discussion infra Part III.F.
106. Franck, supra note 36, at 716 (observing that “states, in their relations
with one another, frequently find themselves tempted to violate a rule of con-
duct in order to take advantage of a sudden opportunity. If they do not do so,
but choose, instead, to obey the rule and forgo that gratification, it is likely to
be because of their longer term interests in seeing a potentially useful rule
reinforced. They can visualize future situations in which it will operate to their
advantage.”).
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grounds for termination by the international advisors of the ad-
visory regime.
A. The Selection of International Advisors
Although the international advisory mechanism would not
function as a judicial tribunal, it may aptly be described as a
quasi-judicial body because its function of interpreting the law
of war and applying such interpretations to determine post facto,
with legal consequences, the compatibility of given military op-
erations with the law of war is of a legal nature and has judicial
characteristics. Therefore, the requirements of independence
and impartiality, which are preconditions for the legitimacy of a
judicial system,107 are also essential for maintaining the legiti-
macy of the advisory mechanism108 and must extend to the se-
lection and functioning of the international advisors. The advi-
sors must also possess the international stature, moral charac-
ter, and legal expertise required for the performance of their
high-stakes quasi-judicial role.
The advisory regime must give an operating state the oppor-
tunity to opt, through the selection of advisors, for an interpre-
tive approach that approximates the moderate LoAC vision, but
preclude a choice by the state of an interpretive approach that
approximates the purist LoAC vision. It must also give a state
an opportunity to advance a vision of the law of war that leans
toward or approximates the IHL vision, by selecting advisors
who adhere to such an interpretive approach.
A two-pronged process for the selection of the international ad-
visors would secure these features of the advisory regime. The
first prong of the selection process would consist of the appoint-
ment by the U.N. Secretary General Q“Secretary General”P of
thirty-six international advisors, whom the Secretary General
would then assign to a dozen three-member advisory panels. To
facilitate the function of the advisory panels and allow a state to
opt for a particular interpretive approach, the Secretary General
would endeavor to ensure, as much as possible, that the panel is
107. Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Prospects for the Increased Inde-
pendence of International Tribunals, 12 GERMANL.J. 1057, 1059 (2011) (noting
that “judicial independence is a necessary condition for legitimacy.”).
108. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534,
1546 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that “it is a fundamental precept of administrative
law that when an agency performs a quasi-judicial (or a quasi-legislative) func-
tion its independence must be protected.”).
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monolithic in the interpretive approach of its members. To this
end, the Secretary General would consult with the advisors re-
garding the formation of the panels. The second prong of the se-
lection process would consist in the selection by each state of a
particular advisory panel to perform the functions of the advi-
sory mechanism in relation to that state. For the sake of effi-
ciency, all panel decisions should be made by a majority vote.
1. The Appointment of Advisors by the Secretary General
The guidelines for the appointment by the Secretary General
of the pool of advisory panels would be laid out by the SC in the
form of a commentary attached to its resolution establishing the
advisory regime. The commentary would reference the law of
war interpretive continuum defined by the purist LoAC and IHL
visions and elaborate on the perceptions underlying these inter-
pretive paradigms. The commentary would identify the moder-
ate LoAC vision as an interpretive approach that is closer to the
purist LoAC vision than to the purist IHL vision, but which, in
contrast with the purist LoAC vision, does not spell general ad-
herence to the most permissive interpretation of the norms of
the law of war made possible by the indeterminacy in the law.
The commentary would guide the Secretary General to form a
pool of advisory panels that represents varying interpretive ap-
proaches, to the exclusion of the purist LoAC vision, and stipu-
late that several of the panels must be comprised of advisors who
adhere to the moderate LoAC vision.
The SC would confirm the appointment of each advisor by the
Secretary General by a majority of its members. This supervi-
sory role would allow the SC to ascertain, as far as possible, not
only that the advisors possess the required qualifications, but
also that the advisory pool does not include advisors adhering to
an interpretive approach that approximates the purist LoAC vi-
sion. Should the SC find that, notwithstanding the guidance pro-
vided to the Secretary General through the commentary, the
moderate LoAC vision lacks sufficient representation within the
advisory pool, it would be able to request that the Secretary Gen-
eral ascribe greater weight to the need to ensure the feasibility
of the advisory regime.
Moreover, the political unfeasibility of an advisory regime that
does not grant a state the opportunity to opt for the moderate
LoAC vision, manifest in the refusal of the bulk of the interna-
tional community to subscribe to the advisory regime, would
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likely exert informal pressure on the Secretary General to reex-
amine the compatibility of the advisory pool with the guidance
provided in the commentary. The requirement that several of the
advisory panels be comprised of advisors who adhere to the mod-
erate LoAC vision would further diminish the risk that an inac-
curate assessment by the Secretary General of the interpretive
approach of some of the advisors would deny states the oppor-
tunity to opt for the moderate LoAC vision.
Discerning the interpretive approach of a potential advisor by
reference to the law of war interpretive continuum is challeng-
ing, but possible. An evaluation by the Secretary General of the
interpretive approach of potential advisors seems analogous to
the evaluation by the UKSK Senate of the “=udicial philosophy” of
prospective federal judges nominated by the President, which
has become an integral part of the Senate confirmation pro-
cess.109 The professional record of international law jurists, in
the form of a paper trail or otherwise, often reveals a general
inclination that places their interpretive approach closer to the
purist LoAC vision than to the purist IHL vision or vice versa.
Similarly, if an international law jurist is disposed to adhere
consistently to the most permissive interpretation of the norms
of the law of war made possible by the indeterminacy of the law,
thereby manifesting the purist LoAC vision, her professional
record is likely to contain strong indications of such inclination.
The main guarantee that the advisory panel does not adhere
to an interpretive approach that approximates the purist LoAC
109. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth
Presidency and Beyond, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454, 1466@67 (2009) (observing a
“rough Senate consensus” that “a judicial nominee’s general judicial philoso-
phy is appropriate for consideration” by the Senate and that confirmation pro-
ceedings demonstrated that “questions regarding general judicial philosophy
can shed light on matters relevant to judicial decision making and to the Sen-
ate’s ultimate decision. . . . In short, the current Senate precedents suggest
that the Senate will consider general judicial philosophy. . . .”); Lori A. Ring-
hand, “I’m Sorry, I Can’t Answer That”: Positive Scholarship and the Supreme
Court Confirmation Process, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 335 (2008) (observing
that many jurists argue “that senators should not ask about a nominee’s polit-
ical preferences or seek answers about particular cases or specific legal ques-
tions, but that they can and should examine a nominee’s 0judicial philosophy’
or overall approach to constitutional interpretation. . . . To the extent that
there is any current consensus on the appropriate scope of senatorial question-
ing, it appears to lie here. . . .”).
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vision would be the advisors’ lack of institutional loyalties eSL
trinsic to the law, which may induce such an interpretive ap-
proach. The most obvious manifestation of such loyalties con-
cerns the role of a state’s own military legal advisorsO which is
defined by a dual function, given that military legal advisors are
required to both accurately identify the constraints imposed on
the military by international law and facilitate the realization of
military objectives.110 Institutional loyalties are typically the
main engine driving the interpretation of indeterminate norms
to the permissive extreme of the law of war interpretive contin-
uum.111 The humanitarian cost of indeterminacy in the law of
war is largely a function of the connection between such indeter-
minacy and the self-interest that guides the interpretation of the
law by a state. A fundamental feature of the advisory regime
would be the insulation of the advisory panel from institutional
loyalties extrinsic to the law.
In the case of military legal advisors affiliated with one of the
warring parties or with a close ally to such party, institutional
loyalties beyond the interest in upholding the law amount to
110. Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical
Account of International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L. L. 1, 20 (2010) (ob-
serving that, in addition to advising on the permissibility under the law of war
of planned military operations, judge advocates have a responsibility “to help
their commanders achieve the objectives of the mission.”); Cohen, Legal Oper-
ational Advice, supra note 1, at 383 (“MAG [Military’s Advocate General] law-
yers are part of an institution which considers one of its major tasks to be as-
sisting commanders to win wars. When faced with clearly prohibited practices,
MAG lawyers stand their ground. During 0gray areas,’ MAG lawyers try to be
responsive to the military. 0Our job,’ one of them publicly acknowledged, 0is to
let the army operate.’”). See also Rao, supra note 1, at 228 (identifying various
agencies within the U.S. executive branch that are responsible for the inter-
pretation of international law, and demonstrating that “each agency has a par-
ticular culture and institutional interests that shape how it provides legal
analysis.”).
111. Winter, supra note 1, at 14 (observing that the objectives, strategies, and
attitudes of jurists advising on the law of war “will be directly related to their
perceptions about their roles in the system and to their identification with cer-
tain groups or individuals.”); id. at 25 (noting that “in the military environ-
ment, where loyalty to one’s commander is considered the hallmark of profes-
sionalism, there is a real danger of losing one’s identity as an independent ad-
viser and assuming the goals, objectives, and strategies of the client.”); Luban,
supra note 52, at 316 (observing that “[t]he two visions of the law of war [i.e.,
the LoAC vision and the IHL vision?A.Z.] closely track organizational cul-
tures.”).
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plain partiality.112 But institutional loyalties that are likely to
affect the interpretation of the law of war by military legal advi-
sors are not confined to advisors affiliated with one of the war-
ring parties, and extend, to some degree, to the profession of mil-
itary legal advisors in general. Pointing to the close professional
discourse and cooperation betweenmilitary legal advisors of var-
ious countries, Amichai Cohen noted that military lawyers form
a “transnational network of like-minded lawyersO”113 which “fits
parallel descriptions of transnational bureaucratic networksK”114
These networksO which are not formal institutionsO “are created
by like-minded regulators from around the world on a basis of
shared interests and knowledgeK”115 Cohen elaborated on the
common goal of military legal advisors:
In order to confront pressures from NGOs, media and public
opinion in some statesO military lawyers have formed a “counL
ter-movement” intended to promote an interpretation of IFC
[international humanitarian law?A.Z.] which will prove more
attenuated with state interests. This transnational network of
lawyers reinforces the more “conservative” interpretation of
IHL, and supports a less restrictive application of this law.116
The institutional affiliation of military legal advisors in gen-
eral suggests that one of their loyalties is to the universal inter-
est of militaries to minimize legal constraints in the conduct of
military operations. This commitment, extrinsic to the law, is
likely to lead an international advisor toward the purist LoAC
vision and away from the moderate LoAC vision, frustrating the
effort to ensure that the advisory regime is politically feasible
and also desirable from a humanitarian perspective.
The Secretary General would therefore not appoint as interna-
tional advisors those who currently are, or who have been until
recently, an integral part of the legal advisory apparatus of any
military. This requirement would not preclude the appointment
112. Partiality of advisors on the law of war may be defined as bias for or
against one of the warring parties. Cf. Republican Party ofMinnesota v. White,
536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002) (observing that the root meaning of “impartiality” in
the judicial context “is the lack of bias for or against either party to the pro-
ceeding.”).
113. Cohen, Legal Operational Advice, supra note 1, at 410.
114. Id. at 409.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 410.
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of former military legal advisors who have retired from such ser-
vice a significant period of time before their appointment, as the
ties that bind such lawyers to the “network of military advisors”
are likely to gradually fade with the passage of time and the
change of careers.
To the requirement that the international advisors be inde-
pendent, impartial, and lack institutional loyalties extrinsic to
the law, which may lead them toward the purist LoAC vision, it
is necessary to add a requirement for international stature.
Given the quasi-judicial role of the advisory mechanism, and
based on the requirements for membership of international
courts and quasi-judicial treaty-bodies,117 the advisors should be
persons of high moral character, integrity, and impartiality,
with recognized expertise in the law of war and human rights
law and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity rel-
evant to the functions of the advisory panels.
The advisory pool appointed by the Secretary General would
likely consist mainly of jurists who have served as judges in in-
ternational courts or who were otherwise a part of the legal ap-
paratus of such a court; jurists who have held a legal position in
one of the various U.N. bodies; former state judges; jurists whose
professional legal experience was acquired in government ser-
vice but not as military legal advisors, and academic scholars.
Each advisory panel would be authorized to employ an assisting
team of military experts that would provide the necessary mili-
tary knowledge.
To maintain the independence of the advisory mechanism, in
considering the appointment of jurists as international advisors,
the Secretary General must refrain from asking these jurists
questions about the interpretation of a particular norm of the
law of war. There is little doubt that making the appointment of
members of judicial or quasi-judicial bodies contingent upon ei-
ther an explicit or implicit pre-commitment on their part regard-
ing the interpretation of a particular norm undermines the in-
dependence of such bodies. Here too, the analogy to the process
undertaken by the U.S. Senate in considering whether to con-
firm the appointment of would-be federal judges nominated by
the President is instructive. The bulk of authority takes the view
117. For a review of such qualification requirements, see Tamar Hostovsky-
Brandes & Ariel Zemach, Controlling the Execution of a Security Council Man-
date to Use Force: Does the Council Need a Lawyer?, 36 FORDHAM INT’LL.J. 657,
691, n. 131 (2012).
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that during Senate confirmation hearings, nominees may be le-
gitimately asked about their “legal philosophy” in generalO but
not about the interpretation of specific legal norms or particular
cases that do not yet represent settled law, because answers to
the latter type of questions may be viewed as a pre-commitment
to decide future cases in a particular way, undermining judicial
independence.118
2. The Selection of an Advisory Panel by an Operating State
The independence of the advisory mechanism also requires
that states not be allowed to select a particular advisory panel
after the interpretation by the panel of the norms of the law of
war has been published. The personal interests that interna-
tional lawyers would have in being appointed to an advisory
panel because of the power, professional prominence, and pres-
tige attached to such appointment would also be at play in the
choice of advisory panels by the various states. Making the se-
lection of a panel by states contingent upon the favorability to
states of particular interpretations of legal norms by the panel
would give rise to a significant conflict of interest in the work of
the panel, which would undermine its independence.
After the advisory panels have been formed, each operating
state would be given three months to select a particular panel
that would perform the functions of the advisory mechanism in
relation to that state. The liberty of an operating state to select
any of the panels comprising the advisory pool would be quali-
fied only by the requirement that the advisors be impartial,
which would bar the selection by a state of a particular panel if
one of its members is affiliated in any way with that state or
with one of its close allies. The Secretary General would have
the power to veto a selection by a state of a particular panel on
118. Ringhand, supra note 109, at 335, 340; Viet D. Dinh, Threats to Judicial
Independence, Real and Imagined, 95 GEO. L.J. 929, 937@38 (2007); Vicki C.
Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Arti-
cle III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 982@83 (2007) (observing that “nominees from
both parties tend to draw some line between general questions, which they will
answer, and questions that may come before them as judges, which they will
not?perhaps reflecting a pragmatic consensus that differences in approach to
interpretation matter, but can be probed only to a limited extent through direct
questioning without compromising other important values.”); Kavanaugh, su-
pra note 109, at 1466.
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partiality grounds. The Secretary General would appoint an ad-
ditional twelve-panel advisory pool every five years to allow
states that had not initially subscribed to the advisory regime to
do so at a later stage.
After the three-month selection period has expired, a panel
that has been selected by at least one state would embark on a
process of laying out a body of instructions that would contain
the norms of the law of war as interpreted by the panel. A panel
may perform its advisory role in relation to many states, but
panels selected by more than one state would issue a separate
body of instructions for each of these states. Although most of
the law of war applies to all states as customary international
law,119 humanitarian law treaties may contain certain provi-
sions that have not acquired the status of customary norms and
therefore only apply to the states that are parties to these trea-
tiesK MoreoverO “the particular theater of war might affect the
application of the Wlaw of warV obligationK”120 The interpretation
of a general requirement of the law of war by the advisors may
therefore produce specific rules that apply to certain potential or
current theaters of war, based, for example, on the density of the
civilian population of a particular area, but not to others.121 The
content of the instructions issued by a panel may thus vary at
the margins from one state to another.
B. The Purview of the Advisory Regime and its Temporal
Boundaries
The purview of the advisory regime would extend to interna-
tional and non-international armed conflicts, as well as to situ-
ations of occupation. The instructions would lay out the param-
eters of each type of armed conflict and of occupation, and would
be conveyed as two separate sets of norms, one regulating inter-
national armed conflict and situations of occupation and the
other non-international armed conflict.
Moreover, once the advisory panel concluded that an operating
state is a party to an armed conflict, it would make a statement
to that effect and pronounce whether the conflict is an interna-
tional or a non-international armed conflict. Similarly, the panel
119. Blum, On a Differential Law of War, supra note 42, at 173 (noting that
“most IHL rules have become customary in nature.”).
120. Id. at 193.
121. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
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would confirm that an occupation by an operating state of a for-
eign territory exists if the circumstances meet the criteria for the
existence of an occupation, as laid out in the instructions. A
statement by the panel confirming the existence of an interna-
tional armed conflict, a non-international armed conflict, or an
occupation would be considered an integral part of the instruc-
tions.
A necessary limitation on the temporal scope of application of
the advisory regime concerns the prolonged nature of the inter-
pretive effort undertaken by the advisors in laying out the in-
structions. The advisory regime would not protect an operating
state or its agents against international or foreign national ad-
judicative proceedings that concern amilitary operation that the
panel determined, on the basis of an ex post facto review, to be
contrary to the law of war. A state would be divested of such
protection even if its violation of the law of war resulted from an
inaccurate interpretation by the state of indeterminate norms
that had yet to be clarified by the instructions at the time of the
operation. If, because of the scarcity of guidance provided by the
instructions, states repeatedly failed to secure the full extent of
protections envisioned under the advisory regime by following
the instructions, the credibility of the regime in the eyes of states
would be diminished and its political feasibility undermined.
This article therefore proposes that the bargain underlying the
advisory regime (i.e., the soft law obligations of an operating
state and the protections that the advisory regime provides)
would take effect one year after the day on which the panel be-
gan to lay out the instructions. This does not represent a time
limit for the completion by the panel of the body of instructions,
as the panel would be able to add to the instructions at any time.
Moreover, the panel would likely continue to expand the body of
instructions after the state has become a party to an armed con-
flict, to tailor the normative guidance it provides the state to
closely correspond to the particular circumstances of the hostili-
ties.
C. The Instructions Provided by the International Advisors
Not all treaty provisions of the law of war represent customary
international law, and the conclusion of treaties is by no means
the only type of state practice that contributes to the formation
of customary law. The vast majority of the customary norms of
the law of war, however, may be stated by reference to treaty
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provisions that have attained the status of customary interna-
tional law.122 The instructions laid out by each advisory panel
may thus be organized around treaty provisions.
Each instruction would first cite the language of one or more
treaty provisions, which in the view of the advisors, represent a
norm of the law of war applicable to the operating state as a
treaty obligation, customary law, or both. An interpretation of
the norm cited would then follow, pushing that norm along a
continuum defined by a pure standard and a pure rule para-
digms toward the latter. In some cases, this advisory effort
would convert a standard into a series of specific rules that, in
the view of the advisors, represent the appropriate concretiza-
tion of a general requirement of the law of war embodied in the
standard. In other cases, the instructions would set forth guide-
lines for the application of a standard, which would reduce inde-
terminacy about the content of the norm, although not to a de-
gree that alters its essentially standard-like nature. Such guide-
lines could combine abstract clarifications of the content of the
standard with the pronouncement of a series of concrete exam-
ples for the application of the norm.
A comprehensive review of indeterminacies in the law of war
that would require the attention of the international advisors far
exceeds the scope of this article. A few examples of the interpre-
tive effort to be undertaken by the advisors, however, are pro-
vided below.
1. The Prohibition Against Attacking Civilians
A fundamental imperative of the law of war concerns the prin-
ciple of distinctionO which holds that “WtVhe parties to the conflict
must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants.
Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must
not be directed against civiliansK”123 This norm, enshrined in Ar-
ticle 48 and Article 51 of the First Additional Protocol to the Ge-
neva Conventions124 Q“Protocol I”PO has ac'uired the status of
customary international law that applies to both international
and non-international armed conflicts.125
122. See generally INT’LCOMM.OF THEREDCROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (Vol. I: Rules) (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-
Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIL Study].
123. CIL Study, supra note 122, at 3.
124. Protocol I, supra note 8, arts. 48, 51.
125. CIL Study, supra note 122, at 3.
44 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 43:1
In the case of an armed conflict between a state and an armed
group, which transcends the territory of the state, it is unclear
whether members of the group are considered combatants or ci-
vilians.126 This indeterminacy concerns largely the controversy
over whether such armed conflict should be classified as an in-
ternational or a non-international conflict, a classification that
affects the civilian or combatant status of individuals.127 The ad-
visory panel would determine whether the armed conflict at
hand is an international or a non-international one, with the in-
structions clarifying indeterminacies regarding the boundaries
between the category of combatants and that of civilians, both in
relation to an international and to a non-international armed
conflict.
The law of war recognizes an exception to the protection
against attack afforded to civilians under the principle of distinc-
tionK This eSception holds that “civilians are protected against
attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hos-
tilitiesK”128 This exception clearly distinguishes between direct
participation in hostilities, which removes the protection against
attack afforded to civilians under the principle of distinction,
and indirect participation in the hostilities, which does not have
such effect. The scope of conducts that amount to direct partici-
pation in hostilities remains unclear.129 For example, the Su-
preme Court of Israel viewed certain forms of participation in
126. The Supreme Court of Israel concluded that members of Palestinian
armed groups engaged in an armed conflict with Israel, which transcended the
territory of Israel, cannot be considered combatants and must therefore be con-
sidered civilians. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel
(Targeted Killing Case) 2006 (2) Isr. L. Rep. 459, 486@88 (Isr.),
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_ eng/02/690/007/e16/02007690.e16.pdf. Several
commentators disagree with the view taken by the Israeli court, arguing that
members of an armed group engaged in an armed conflict against a state,
which transcends the territory of that state, are considered combatants. See
Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, ‘We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the
Law’: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 233, 271 (2003); Kretzmer, Targeted Killing, supra note 94, at 198.
127. Kretzmer, Targeted Killing, supra note 94, at 190@98.
128. Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(3).
129. CIL Study, supra note 122, at 23 (noting that “a clear and uniform defi-
nition of direct participation in hostilities has not been developed in State prac-
tice.”).
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hostilities by civilians as direct participation,130 whereas a com-
mentary by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) considered such conducts to be indirect participation,
having no effect on the immunity against attack afforded to ci-
vilians.131
The advisors would be able to pronounce rules clarifying which
forms of participation in the hostilities other than actual fighting
(e.g., production or transfer of weapons; recruitment of other ci-
vilians to take direct part in hostilities; planning or ordering the
commission of acts of violence by others; financing the armed
forces or providing them with food, housing, or other logistical
support) amount to direct participation in hostilities and which
forms are considered indirect participation. The temporal con-
tours of the exception, which divests civilians of protection
against attack only “for such time” as they directly participate
in hostilities, are also unclear132 and would be clarified by the
panel.
2. The Distinction between Military and Civilian Objects
The instructions may also contain rules resolving indetermi-
nacies surrounding the customary norm of the law of war that
requires belligerents to distinguish between military objects
that may legitimately be attacked and civilian objects, which
may not.133 For example, the ICRC has taken the view that elec-
tric power plants are considered military objective only if they
produce electricity “mainly for military consumptionK”134 One
130. Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel, supra note 126, at 496@99
(concluding that the concept of “direct participation in hostilities” includes not
only persons who carry out the attacks but also those who recruit them or pro-
vide them with weapons as well as those who plan and direct the attacks).
131. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THENOTION
OFDIRECT PARTICIPATION INHOSTILITIESUNDER INTERNATIONALHUMANITARIAN
LAW 53 (2009), https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0990-interpretive-guid-
ance-notion-direct-participation-hostilities-under-international [hereinafter
DPH Study].
132. Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel, supra note 126, at 499@
500 (concluding that persons involved in ongoing hostile activities are subject
to targeting even during the time in between hostile acts.); DPH Study, supra
note 131, at 44@45 (rejecting “any extension of the concept of direct participa-
tion in hostilities beyond specific acts.”).
133. Protocol I, supra note 8, arts. 48, 52(2); CIL Study, supra note 122, at
25.
134. COMMENTARY ON THEADDITIONALPROTOCOLS, supra note 31, at 633, note
3.
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can point, however, to state practice supporting the view that
power plants that serve both the military and the civilian popu-
lation are considered military objective, regardless of whether
the military is the main consumer of the electricity produced.135
The advisors would have an opportunity to lay out rules resolv-
ing such controversies and clarifying the type and extent of con-
tribution to the military effort that justifies the classification of
certain dual-use objects (i.e., objects that serve both the civilian
population and the military) as military objectives.
3. The Prohibition against the Use of Indiscriminate Weapons
Article 51(4) of Protocol I, which embodies a customary norm
of the law of war, prohibits indiscriminate attacks.136 This pro-
hibition entails, among other things, that parties to an armed
conflict may not use indiscriminate weaponsO defined as “weapL
ons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and
military targetsK”137 An ICRC Commentary has observed that
the determination of whether a particular weapon is considered
indiscriminate may vary from one situation to another.138 When
used in densely populated areas, certain weapons with wide area
effects, such as artillery shells, may be considered indiscrimi-
nate, although the use of such weapons in other, less populated
areas, may be allowed.
The question of whether the use of a particular weapon should
be considered an “indiscriminate attack” eStends to normative
assessments, as it requires determining the degree of impreci-
sion that brings the use of the weapon under the prohibition, in
view of the vicinity and density of civilian presence. The advisors
135. UKMINISTRY OFDEFENCE, THEMANUAL OF THE LAW OFARMEDCONFLICT
56@57 (2004); US Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,
Final Report to Congress (1992) (Department of Defense Report) 96; YORAM
DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMEDCONFLICT 105 (2nd ed., 2010) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, CONFLICT].
136. Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(4); CIL Study, supra note 122, at 37.
137. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 257 [P 78] (July 8). See also Protocol I, supra note 8, art.
51(4)(a); CIL Study, supra note 122, at 40, 244@46.
138. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 31, at 623 (ex-
plaining how many take the view that “means or methods of combat which can
be used perfectly legitimately in some situations could, in other circumstances,
have effects that would be contrary to some limitations contained in the Proto-
col, in which event their use in those circumstances would involve an indis-
criminate attack.”).
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would be able to set rules that respond to the circumstances of a
given theater of war, banning the use of certain types of weapons
in certain areas designated by the advisors.
4. The Proportionality Requirement
The law of war principle of proportionality prohibits “any atL
tack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combina-
tion thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipatedK”139 The application of
the proportionality principle is highly problematic because it re-
quires weighing incommensurables: the value of innocent hu-
man lives against the military value of destroying a military ob-
jective.140 Any attempt to lay out comprehensive guidelines clar-
ifying the relative weight of the various interests and values per-
taining to proportionality analysis, transforming the proportion-
ality requirement from a standard-like norm into a rule-like
normO would be hampered by “the very nature of the principle of
proportionality?an open-ended legal standard designed to ac-
commodate an indefinite number of changing circumstancesK”141
The instructions, however, could address various unresolved
questions concerning the application of the proportionality re-
quirement. For example, the instructions could offer guidance
regarding the relevance to proportionality analysis of a volun-
tary choice by civilians to assemble within or in proximity of a
military objective in order to shield it from attack. Some com-
mentators take the view that if civilians freely choose to become
“human shieldsO” a belligerent party may disregard the risk of
collateral damage in relation to such civilians.142 Others argue
that such voluntary choice on the part of civilians is immaterial
to a proportionality analysis and that such civilians retain the
139. Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(5)(b).
140. Robert D. Sloane, Puzzles of Proportion and the “Reasonable Military
Commander”: Reflections on the Law, Ethics, and Geopolitics of Proportional-
ity, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 299, 321 (2015) (noting that “the core of the principle
[of proportionality] is a directive to weigh incommensurables.”).
141. Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany, A Development of Modest Proportions:
The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in the Targeted Killings
Case, 5 J. INT’LCRIM. JUST. 310, 316 (2007).
142. DINSTEIN, CONFLICT, supra note 135, at 153; Michael N. Schmitt & John
J. Merriam, The Tyranny of Context: Israeli Targeting Practices in Legal Per-
spective, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 53, 116@17 (2015).
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full extent of protection afforded to civilians under the law of
war.143 The advisors would be able to take a stand on this con-
troversy. Another example of indeterminacy arising from the
proportionality requirement, which the instructions could ad-
dress, concerns the degree of risk to their own lives that soldiers
should be expected to assume in order to minimize civilian cas-
ualties.144
The instructions could also provide concrete examples regard-
ing the application of the proportionality standard, pronouncing
on the relative weight of competing interests. For example, in
view of an extensive record demonstrating that rockets fired by
Palestinian armed groups at Israel pose a limited threat to Is-
raeli civilians, the advisors could take the view that an aerial
attack aimed at destroying a reservoir of twenty rockets would
not meet the proportionality requirement if it is expected to re-
sult in the killing of five civilians. Similarly, the advisors could
opine that an attack targeting an enemy tank would generally
fail the proportionality test if it is expected to cause the death of
ten civilians. The instructions could also indicate that the de-
struction of a power plant would violate the requirement of pro-
portionality even if the plant is considered a military object, if
the attack is likely to result in the death of numerous civilians
who depend on the electricity produced by the plant for the sup-
ply of drinking water. The examples contained in the instruc-
tions mayO at the advisors’ discretionO rely on the =urisprudence
of international or national tribunals.145
Because the principle of proportionality depends on the weigh-
ing of incommensurables, any attempt to capture this principle
using examples containing precise figures necessarily presup-
poses certain margins of arbitrariness. The purpose of the exam-
ples would not be to delineate the precise boundaries separating
the proportionate from the disproportionate, as proportionality
defies such precision. Rather, the examples are a necessary
means to promote compliance with the principle of proportional-
ity as far as possible.
143. DPH Study, supra note 131, at 57.
144. Blum, On a Differential Law of War, supra note 42, at 190 (observing
various unresolved questions arising in relation to the principle of proportion-
ality).
145. For an example of such jurisprudence, see Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No.
IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶¶ 386@87 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the For-
mer Yugoslavia) (Dec. 5, 2003).
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Going back to one of the examples above, when it emerges from
the instructions to reality, the tank that is surrounded by ten
civilians may present an imminent threat to the lives of many
soldiers. An effort on the part of a military commander to draw
analogies from examples provided by the advisors to the circum-
stances surrounding contemplated attacks would often be en-
cumbered by the over-simplification of the former in relation to
the latter. Yet in many cases it would be difficult for a warring
party to make a plausible argument reconciling an attack with
the principle of proportionality in view of the examples provided
by the advisors.
D. The Advisory Regime and the Principle of Equality in the
Law of War
A fundamental principle of the law of war is the equal applica-
tion of the law Q“principle of e'uality”PK146 This principle man-
dates “the uniform and generic treatment of all belligerents on
the battlefield according to the same rules and principles . . . [law
of war] obligations bind all parties equally, regardless of the type
of war they fight, the justness of their respective causes, or the
disparities in power and capabilities between themK”147 The ad-
visory regime would play an important role in the enhancement
of the principle of equality, as it would restrict the liberty of var-
ious international law compliance agents to apply the standards
of the law of war differently from one situation to the next, based
on political considerations and depending on the identity of the
belligerents involved.
At the same time, under the terms of the advisory regime,
states that subscribed to that regime would be subject to differ-
entiated application of the norms of the law of war, depending
on each state’s choice of advisory panelK All states would be
granted equal opportunity to subscribe to the advisory regime
and to opt, through the selection of a panel, for any of the inter-
pretive approaches to the law of war available under the advi-
sory regime. Allowing all states to freely select any of the panels
operating under the advisory regime, however, would not make
the advisory regime cost-free as far as its effect on the principle
146. Blum, On a Differential Law of War, supra note 42, at 165 (“The current
system of the laws of war, or as they are otherwise known, international hu-
manitarian law, builds on the principle of the equal application of the law.”).
147. Id.
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of equality is concerned. Panels sharing a general interpretive
approach toward the law of war may nevertheless provide diver-
gent interpretations of certain norms. Therefore, various states
that through the selection of different panels opted for the mod-
erate LoAC vision, with a view to securing the broadest permis-
sion to exercise force available under the advisory regime, would
likely be subjected to differentiated application of certain norms
of the law of war. This aspect of the advisory regime raises equal-
ity concerns.
To allay such concerns, a party to an armed conflict should be
given an opportunity to replace the panel it initially selected
with the panel advising its adversary. After a panel advising an
operating state has determined that the state is a party to an
armed conflict, any other operating state that is a party to that
conflict would be allowed within seven days to substitute that
panel for the one it had initially selected. A choice by a state to
substitute one panel for another would also apply to the instruc-
tions issued by the panels. This would represent an exception to
the rule precluding a state from selecting a panel after the panel
had published the instructions.
E. The Oversight Role of the International Advisors
The guidance provided by the instructions would be aug-
mented by an oversight mechanism, by which the advisory pan-
els would monitor compliance of operating states with the law of
war. If, based on the information available to it, an advisory
panel is concerned that a particular action taken by an operating
state may be inconsistent with the law of war, it would initiate
a post facto review of such action. The purpose of such review
would be to determine whether the conduct in question was con-
trary to the law of war and to further clarify the norms of the
law of war pertaining to such conduct. This Section will deline-
ate the framework for the post facto review process and address
secrecy concerns on the part of operating states, which might
encumber the review process.
1. The Post Facto Review Process
At the outset of the post facto review process, the panel would
present the operating state with a detailed account of the infor-
mation available to the advisors, an explanation of why this in-
formation raises concern regarding inconsistency between the
conduct of the state and the law of war, and a request that the
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state respond to such concerns. The state’s response would have
to include a detailed account of the circumstances that, accord-
ing to the state, surrounded the conduct in question. The panel
would also be able to request specific information that would as-
sist the advisors in their review.
The panel would assess the factual statements made by the
state against information available to it from any source the
panel deems reliable, including other states, media outlets,
NGOs, and private individuals. The experience of other U.N.
fact-finding bodies suggests that such information would in-
cludeO among othersO “interviews with victims and witnesses K K K
written submissions and other documentation from a wide range
of sources, including eyewitnesses, affidavits, medical reports,
expert weapons analyses, satellite imagery, video film footage
and other photographic evidence from incident sites and injury
documentationK”148
Upon completion of its review process, the panel would issue
observations containing a reasoned determination of whether
the conduct of the state has been consistent with the law of war.
In its observations, the panel would be bound by its own inter-
pretation of the law laid out in the instructions. The panel would
also have the opportunity to elaborate on the legal guidance pro-
vided by existing instructions, and to provide guidance with re-
gard to norms of the law of war that are yet to be addressed by
the instructions.
Drawing on the practice of other U.N. fact-finding bodies, the
panel would base its factual findings on a “reasonable grounds”
standard of proof.149 The panel would conclude that there are
reasonable grounds establishing a factual finding “whenever it
was satisfied that it had obtained a reliable body of information,
consistent with other material, based on which a reasonable and
148. U.N. Human Rights Council, Independent Comm. of Inquiry established
pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-21/1, Report of the Detailed
Findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to
Human Rights Council Resolution S-21/1, para. 14, A/HRC/29/CRP.4 (June 24,
2015) [hereinafter Gaza Report].
149. U.N. Human Rights Council, Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Report of the Comm. of Inquiry on Hu-
man Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, para. 22,
A/HRC/25/63 (Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Korea Report]; Gaza Report, supra
note 148, ¶ 19.
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ordinarily prudent person would have reason to believe”150 the
accuracy of such finding.
The instructions and the observations would combine to form
the entire body of legal guidance provided by the advisors. The
observations may also contain operative recommendations re-
garding acts that an operating state should take or refrain from
taking in order to cease an ongoing violation of the law of war.
The protections against adjudicative measures extended to an
operating state and its agents under the advisory regime would
apply unless such measures concern conduct that the observa-
tions considered contrary to the law of war. A finding by the
panel of a violation by an operating state of a particular norm of
the law of war would allow adjudicative measures against the
state and its agents to the extent that such proceedings pursue
allegations that closely relate to the violation found by the panel.
Protections against adjudicative measures would also be re-
moved in relation to conduct that the advisors could not effec-
tively review because of withholding of information by the state
on national security grounds.151 Hence, the post facto review
mechanism would function as a filter for adjudicative enforce-
ment measures pursued against an operating state or its agents
by the various law of war compliance agents.
Granting the various law of war compliance agents the discre-
tion to determine whether adjudicative enforcement measures
directed at a particular state or its agents are consistent with
the instructions would provide little protection for a state’s
choice to follow the law of war as interpreted by the panel. Fac-
tual findings by various compliance agents, as well as their un-
derstanding of the content of the instructions, might be affected
by a desire to promote a humanitarian agenda that departs from
the interpretive approach of the instructions as well as by a far
less noble political agenda. Therefore, using the post facto review
of the panel as a filter for enforcement measures undertaken by
the various compliance agents would be essential for the credi-
bility of the bargain that underlies the advisory regime.
150. Korea Report, supra note 149, ¶ 22. See also Gaza Report, supra note
148, ¶ 19.
151. See infra Part III.E.2.
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2. The Post Facto Review Process and National Security
Information
An operating state would be required by the terms of the advi-
sory regime to comply with requests for information submitted
by the panel in relation to its post facto review efforts. This soft
law obligation would admit a single exception. Secrecy concerns
loom large, and resistance on the part of states to release infor-
mation that they believe implicates their national security,
which often encumbers national as well as international judicial
proceedings, would also affect the post facto review process con-
ducted by the panel. The extent of state sensitivity to this issue
is exemplified by the language of the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court Q“Rome Statute”PO which singles out naL
tional security concerns as the only explicit exception to the duty
of member states to comply with requests by the International
Criminal Court (ICC) for evidentiary assistance.152
In view of political feasibility considerations, states should not
be required to provide the international advisors with infor-
mation that they believe would implicate their national security.
The protections against adjudicative measures granted to an op-
erating state and its agents under the advisory regime would not
apply, however, to conduct that the panel determined could not
be effectively reviewed because of the withholding of information
by the state on national security grounds. Moreover, the advisors
would maintain discretion to terminate a state’s participation in
the advisory regime if the state repeatedly invoked the national
security exemption, citing concerns that the advisors believe to
be without foundation.
A measure modeled after an existing practice set forth by the
Rome Statute could allay, if not entirely resolve, the challenge
to the review process presented by national security concerns.
Article 93 of the Rome Statute lays out the obligations of mem-
ber states in complying with ICC requests for assistance in in-
vestigations and prosecutions.153 Article 39Q8P provides that “a
State Party may deny a request for assistance, in whole or in
152. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 93(4), July 17,
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1582 (Otto
Triffterer ed., 2008) (observing that Article 93(4) of the Rome Statute “is the
only explicit reason for denial in the Statute.”).
153. Rome Statute, supra note 152, art. 93.
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part, only if the request concerns the production of any docu-
ments or disclosure of evidence which relates to its national se-
curity.”154 The national security exemption contained in Article
93(4) is subject to the provisions of Article 72 of the Rome Stat-
ute, which requires that a state invoking this exemption engage
in extensive discourse with the ICC in order to provide the par-
ties to the proceeding as much information as possible.155 Such
discourse may result in an “agreement on conditions under
which the assistance could be provided, including, among other
things, providing summaries or redactions, limitations on disclo-
sure, use of in camera or ex parte proceedings, or other protective
measures permissible under the StatuteK”156
It is widely agreed that “the final decision on whether to disL
close national security information rests essentially with the
State and not the CourtK”157 Under no circumstances may the
ICC issue an order requiring a state to disclose information in
its possession that in the opinion of the state implicates its na-
tional security interests.158 It appears, however, that the draft-
ers of the Rome Statute have envisaged that the intensive dis-
course requirement would encumber any attempt by a state to
cite bogus national security concerns in reliance on the national
security exemption, and would serve to narrow the scope of un-
disclosed materials held by a state invoking the exemption in
good faith.
The advisory regime would require that if a state invokes na-
tional security concerns with regard to information requested by
the panel, the two must engage in a discourse of the type envis-
aged by the Rome StatuteO “to resolve the matter by cooperative
meansK”159 Such discourse, encouraged by the incentive for states
to retain the protections afforded under the advisory regime,
154. Id., art. 93(4).
155. Id., art. 72.
156. Id.
157. RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
68 (2002).
158. Matthias Neuner, The Power of International Criminal Tribunals to
Produce Evidence, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 163, 188 (Herwig Roggemann & Petar Sarcevic eds., 2002) (noting that
“if the State possesses the document, it makes the final decision as to whether
national security concerns prevent disclosure. The judges of the ICC cannot
simply overrule this decision and compel the State to produce the document.”).
159. Rome Statute, supra note 152, art. 72(1)(5).
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would often result in an agreement that would allow the provi-
sion of information to the advisors in a redacted or summarized
form that would enable the advisors to proceed with an effective
review process.
F. Grounds for Termination of the Advisory Regime
It would be unrealistic to expect that the advisory regime com-
pletely resolves the problem of non-compliance with the law of
war, and such expectation cannot become a condition for the con-
tinued application of the regime in an armed conflict. To prevent
states from exploiting the advisory regime, however, conduct by
an operating state that demonstrates clear lack of commitment
to follow the legal guidance provided by the panel should consti-
tute grounds for termination by the panel of the state’s particiL
pation in the advisory regime. Such conduct could take three
forms: (a) the operating state openly declines to abide by the
panel’s interpretation of the law of warO laid out in the instrucL
tions or observations; (b) the operating state repeatedly acts in
a manner that is clearly inconsistent with the legal guidance
provided in the instructions and observations. This article pro-
poses to allow the panel discretion in determining the number of
acts contrary to its interpretation of the law of war that indicates
clear lack of commitment to follow the normative guidance pro-
vided by the panel and hence warrants the termination of the
advisory regime; (c) an act of the operating state, carried out
with the approval of the highest political or military echelons,
that is clearly inconsistent with the panel’s interpretation of the
law of war and amounts to a particularly egregious violation of
the law of war. Here too, the advisors should have the discretion
to determine whether a single violation of the law of war, in view
of its gravity, attests to clear lack of commitment by the state to
abide by the legal guidance provided by the panel.
Additional grounds for the termination by a panel of the advi-
sory regime would arise from failure by an operating state to
abide by its soft law obligations with regard to the conduct of the
post facto review. Hence, the advisory regime would be termi-
nated under the following circumstances: (a) the operating state
refuses to provide the advisors with information in a manner
that clearly and repeatedly deviates from the terms of the advi-
sory regime, or (b) the operating state obstructs the post facto
review process through the intimidation of witnesses, destruc-
tion of evidence, etc.
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IV. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ADVISORY REGIME AND THE
REACH OF SC POWERS
This Part will demonstrate that the powers of the SC to act by
way of legislative resolutions accommodate the establishment by
the SC of the proposed advisory regime, including the protec-
tions against adjudicative enforcement measures provided to an
operating state and its agents under the advisory regime. This
Part will also elaborate on the scope and significance of these
protections. Finally, it will examine the extent of protections
against economic sanctions that could be afforded to states un-
der the advisory regime.
A. Legislative SC Resolutions
The proposed advisory regime could, in theory, be introduced
by means of a new multilateral treaty. Any effort, however, to
agree upon a mechanism for the interpretation of the law of war
is likely to be viewed by states as a renegotiation of current in-
ternational humanitarian treaties. Therefore, the prohibitive
costs of renegotiating multilateral treaties160 would also greatly
encumber the effort to establish an advisory regime that is
grounded in treaty law. In the absence of a realistic treaty-based
path for the introduction of the advisory regime, the legal pro-
tections from adjudicative enforcement measures granted to
states and their agents under this regime can be secured only
through SC action. This article therefore proposes establishing
the advisory regime through the exercise of SC powers.
The U.N. Charter assigns “primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security”161 to the SC.
To enable the SC to carry out this responsibility, the Charter
vests in the SC, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
power to issue resolutions that are legally binding on all states,
and to take the necessary measures to compel states to abide by
their legal obligations under such resolutions.162 The SC can ex-
ercise Chapter VII powers only after having determined, pursu-
160. Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, supra note 3, at 353; Cohen, Rules
and Standards, supra note 3, at 60; CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 208.
161. U.N. Charter, art. 24.
162. U.N. Charter, arts. 25, 39, 41@42.
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ant to Article 39 of the Charter, the existence of a threat to in-
ternational peace and security, breach of the peace, or act of ag-
gression.163
The SC construed its authority under Chapter VII as not being
restricted to threats emanating from a particular situation or
conflict,164 allowing it to maintain international peace and secu-
rity also by means of “legislative resolutionsO”165 which set forth
“global norms”166 of international law applicable for an indefinite
163. U.N. Charter, art. 39.
164. Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Coun-
cil: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 283 (2008)
(observing that SC Resolution 1373, which concerned counterterrorism
measures, and Resolution 1540, which aimed to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, were innovative because “[r]ather than issuing
commands to deal with a discrete conflict, they create obligations of a sort usu-
ally found only in treaties. They create law for all states in a general issue area,
without setting any time limit or conditions for terminating the obligations.”);
Eric Rosand, The Security Council as “Global Legislator”: Ultra Vires or Ultra
Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 542 (2005) (observing that the adoption by
the SC of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 “has been described as 0global legislat-
ing’?as distinguished from taking decisions, which impose binding obligations
that relate to a particular dispute or situation. . . .”); id. at 547@48 (noting that
resolutions 1373 and 1540 responded “not to a specific situation or threat but
to one of a global nature. Additionally . . . both use the Council’s authority
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to impose far-reaching binding obliga-
tions on all States. . . . In doing so, both resolutions seek to establish global
norms.”); José E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J.
INT’L L. 873, 874 (2003) (observing that the counterterrorism resolutions
adopted by the SC “present the clearest examples of that body’s new 0legisla-
tive’ phase. In this case, the Council is no longer responding with discrete ac-
tion directed at a particular state because of a concrete threat to the peace
arising from a specific incident.”); Sumon Dantiki, Power Through Process: An
Administrative Law Framework for United Nations Legislative Resolutions, 40
GEO. J. INT’LL. 655 (2009) (“Resolution 1373 was not merely a use of the Coun-
cil’s authority to address a specific instance or entity that posed an interna-
tional threat but was a binding legal directive for nation-states to alter their
domestic legal processes in response to the nonspecific and ongoing threat of
transnational terrorism.”); Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legis-
lating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 902 (2002).
165. Dantiki, supra note 164, at 655@56 (“Resolution 1373 was the first of a
new category of legislative resolutions. Such resolutions share two features.
First, like all Chapter VII Security Council resolutions, they are binding upon
states, superseding even treaty obligations. Second, legislative resolutions
compel states to alter their domestic laws without limiting the change to a spe-
cific crisis or entity.”).
166. Rosand, supra note 164, at 547.
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period of time.167 This broad construction of its authority was
first pronounced by the SC in Resolution 1373, adopted in the
wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which re-
quired all states to pursue a wide range of counter-terrorism ef-
forts.168 All states were legally obligated by the terms of this res-
olution to criminalize terrorist financing activities, freeze terror-
ist funds, prohibit support of terrorist groups, reform immigra-
tion and asylum procedures, share intelligence information, and
deny safe haven to terrorists.169 In 2004, the SC proceeded to
adopt Resolution 1540, which requires all states to take a wide
range of measures, including domestic legislation, to prevent the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and, in par-
ticular, to ensure that such weapons are not acquired by non-
state actors.170
Resolutions 1373 and 1540 departed from previous SC prac-
tice, which confined its use of Chapter VII powers to responding
to threats to international peace and security emanating from
specific situations.171 As noted by one commentator, these reso-
lutions “were not merely directed at a particular terrorist act,
but at all future acts of terrorismK”172 These resolutions imposed
far-reaching binding obligations on all statesO “sub=ect to no geoL
graphic or temporal limitation”173 in terms of the threat ad-
dressed. The SC response to nonspecific threats of terrorism and
WMZ proliferation amounted to the regulation of “a general isL
sue areaO”174 with the SC assuming the role of a “global legislaL
tor”175 that enunciates “new binding rules of international law?
rather than mere commands relating to a particular situa-
tionK”176
167. Johnstone, supra note 164, at 283.
168. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶¶ 1@2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sep. 28, 2001).
169. Id.
170. S.C. Res. 1540, ¶¶ 1@3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
171. Rosand, supra note 164, at 567@68.
172. Id. at 568.
173. Alvarez, supra note 164, at 874. See also, Rosand, supra note 164, at 569
(observing that “neither Resolution 1373 nor Resolution 1540 contains an ex-
plicit or implicit time limitation.”); Szasz, supra note 164, at 902.
174. Johnstone, supra note 164, at 283.
175. Rosand, supra note 164, at 572 (observing that “with the adoption of
resolutions such as 1373 and 1540, one could argue that the Charter has once
again evolved to allow the Council to act as a 0global legislator’ under certain
circumstances.”).
176. Szasz, supra note 164, at 902.
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Resolution 1373 was adopted less than a month after the Sep-
tember 11th attacks, and can be explained by a sense of solidar-
ity throughout the international community with the United
States, which proposed it.177 By contrast, Resolution 1540 was
adopted in 2004, despite political tension between SC members
arising from the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and its allies.178
ThereforeO “unlike <959O Resolution 1540 was not motivated by
broad international sympathy for an American-led security
agenda and demonstrates that legislative resolutions occur out-
side eStreme political circumstancesK”179
The SC enjoys a vast discretion in determining the scope of its
own authority.180 The bulk of authority has acknowledged the
lawfulness of SC legislative resolutions,181 proposing improve-
ments in the decision-making process of the SC, which would
enhance the legitimacy of such resolutions.182 It has been noted
that “Security Council legislative resolutions show great prom-
ise to complement existing treaty regimes and better address
pressing international challenges.”183 Commentators have pro-
posed expanding the use of legislative resolutions beyond coun-
ter-terrorism and WMD non-proliferation efforts to a wide range
of threats to international peace and security.184
177. Dantiki, supra note 164, at 662.
178. Id. at 662.
179. Id. at 662@63.
180. Johnstone, supra note 164, at 299 (“Articles 24 and 25 [of the U.N. Char-
ter], and Chapter VII confer broad authority on the Council to take whatever
measures it deems necessary to maintain and restore international peace and
security.”).
181. Id. (observing with regard to Resolutions 1373 and 1540, “no evident
legal rule prohibits [the SC] from acting in a legislative . . . manner.”); Alvarez,
supra note 164, at 886; Szasz, supra note 164, at 904@05.
182. Johnstone, supra note 164, at 275; Alvarez, supra note 164, at 888.
183. Dantiki, supra note 164, at 657. See also Szasz, supra note 164, at 905
(observing the “pioneering nature” of Resolution 1373, Szasz submits, “[n]ow
that this door has been opened . . . it seems likely to constitute a precedent for
further legislative activities. If used prudently, this new tool will enhance the
United Nations and benefit the world community, whose ability to create in-
ternational law through traditional processes has lagged behind the urgent re-
quirements of the new millennium.”); Alvarez, supra note 164, at 887 (observ-
ing, “it may sometimes be necessary for Council members to use their exclusive
legislative capacity to short-circuit arduous international treaty negotia-
tions.”).
184. Szasz, supra note 164, at 904 (advocating further adoption by the SC of
“legislative resolutions” to impose a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and sub-
mitting that “[t]he Council might even consider extreme violations of human
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The SC took the view that its responsibility to maintain inter-
national peace and security extends to the prevention of wide-
spread violations of the law of war.185 Pursuant to Article 39 of
the Charter, it determined that such violations amounted to a
threat to international peace and security.186 This view allows
the SC to use its Chapter VII powers to lay out the normative
framework for the operation of the advisory regime. The advi-
sory regime would reduce the risk that indeterminacy in the law
of war results in military operations pursued by a state based on
extremely permissive interpretations of this body of law, viewed
by most of the international community as violations of the law
of war. The significance of indeterminacy in the law as a facili-
tator of state conduct that most of the international community
would consider a violation of the law of war depends largely on
the link between such indeterminacy and the self-interest that
guides the interpretation of the law by a state. The advisory re-
gime would do away with this link as an engine of non-compli-
ance, insulating the interpretation of indeterminate norms from
loyalties extrinsic to the law. Moreover, the sway of the proposed
advisory regime in enhancing compliance with the law of war
extends beyond the problem of indeterminacy in the law, as the
regime establishes an incentive structure that increases the
compliance pull of the law of war in general.
The SC resolution introducing the advisory regime would pro-
vide for the establishment of the advisory panels under Article
29 of the U.N. CharterO which authoriRes the SC to “establish
such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the perfor-
mance of its functionsK”187 The resolution would then proceed to
lay out the terms of the advisory regime, including the process
rights or humanitarian law, or massive assaults on the international environ-
ment, to constitute unacceptable threats to the peace, and legislate accord-
ingly.”); Shirley V. Scott, Climate Change and Peak Oil as Threats to Interna-
tional Peace and Security: Is it Time for the Security Council to Legislate?, 9
MELB. J. INT’LL. 495, 496, 507 (2008) (relying on SC Resolutions 1373 and 1540
to suggest the possibility of SC environmental legislation in response to the
threat presented by climate change).
185. S.C. Res. 808, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
186. Id. See also James D. Fry, The UN Security Council and the Law of
Armed Conflict: Amity or Enmity?, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 327, 329 (2006)
(noting that “Security Council Resolution 808, dealing with Serbian violence in
Bosnia and Croatia, states that violations of international humanitarian law
are themselves a threat to international peace and security.”).
187. U.N. Charter, art. 29.
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for the appointment of members of the advisory panels and for
the selection of panels by the various states; the functions of the
advisory panels (i.e., issuing instructions and carrying out the
post facto review) and guidelines for the performance of these
functions; the soft law obligations that a state would have to un-
dertake in order to subscribe to the advisory regime; the protec-
tions against enforcement measures granted to a state under the
advisory regime; and the grounds for termination of the advisory
regime in relation to a particular state.
B. Protection Against Criminal Adjudicative Measures
The advisory regime would protect the agents of the operating
state from criminal prosecution concerning conduct carried out
by such agents in relation to an armed conflict. Such protections
would extend to criminal proceedings before the ICC or any
other international criminal tribunal, and to proceedings before
any foreign national court, regardless of the basis for jurisdiction
invoked by such foreign court. The terms of the advisory regime
would not preclude the operating state from exercising its own
criminal jurisdiction over its agents. The protections against
criminal prosecution available to the agents of the operating
state under the advisory regime would be removed with respect
to conduct that the advisory panel deemed, based on its post
facto review, to be in violation of the law of war.
A violation by a state of the law of war does not necessarily
amount to criminal conduct on the part of individuals acting on
behalf of the state. The advisory panel would not examine
whether conduct by agents of the state fulfilled the elements of
particular crimes recognized under international law. Rather,
the review by the panel of the legality of the conduct of the state
under the law of war would act as a preliminary filter for future
criminal proceedings undertaken by national or international
courts.
Tying the liberty of courts to try agents of an operating state
for international crimes committed in an armed conflict to the
violation of the law of war does not, in itself, grant any immunity
to perpetrators of international crimes. War crimes are grave vi-
olations of the law of war. Furthermore, acts amounting to
crimes against humanity or to the crime of genocide also violate
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the law of war, when committed in relation to an armed con-
flict.188
Many international lawyers, however, would view the advisory
regime as ceding a certain amount of international criminal jus-
tice. In many cases, the norms of the law of war that are binding
upon states are either identical or very similar to the factual el-
ements of war crimes.189 Hence, conduct that is not viewed as a
violation of the law of war under the interpretive approach of the
moderate LoAC vision would in many cases amount to a war
crime under an interpretive approach that leans toward the IHL
vision. Under the terms of the advisory regime, the liberty of any
court, other than those of the operating state, to adjudicate alle-
gations that agents of the operating state committed war crimes,
or any other international crimes, would be contingent upon de-
termination by the advisory panel that the operating state vio-
lated the law of war. The panel would examine the existence of
such a violation based on the interpretive approach of the mod-
erate LoAC vision. Hence, from the perspective of lawyers ad-
hering to the IHL vision, the advisory regime would, in some
cases, make perpetrators of international crimes immune from
criminal prosecutions.
Can the SC compel the ICC and national courts engaged in the
enforcement of international criminal law to defer to the inter-
pretive views of the advisory panels, even if such deference
spells, in the view of such judicial authorities, impunity for per-
petrators of international crimes? The answer appears to be af-
firmative. Noting the power of the SC, acting under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter, to grant immunity to perpetrators of inter-
national crimes as a means of supporting peace agreements that
provide for national amnesty, Scott Lyons explains:
If the Security Council decides via a resolution that respecting
an amnesty agreement for crimes against humanity is needed
for peace and security, it can use Chapter VII powers to impose
188. Compare the definition of genocide and crimes against humanity, con-
tained in the Rome Statute, with the Statute’s definition of war crimes. Rome
Statute, supra note 152, arts. 6@8.
189. For example, the principle of distinction in the law of war holds that
attacks must not be directed against civilians unless, and for such time, as they
take a direct part in hostilities. Protocol I, supra note 8, arts. 48, 51. The Rome
Statute provides that “intentionally directing attacks against the civilian pop-
ulation as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostili-
ties” constitutes a war crime. Rome Statute, supra note 152, art. 8(2)(b)(i).
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a binding obligation to carry out this decision on all 193 mem-
ber States of the U.N. . . . The binding resolution would effec-
tively prevent States from exercising jurisdiction. . . .190
Protections against foreign criminal prosecutions granted by
the SC to nationals of certain states have also amounted to ex
ante immunity.191 SC Resolution 1497 provides that troops con-
tributed to peacekeeping forces in Liberia by a state that is not
a party to the Rome Statute “shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of that contributing state for all alleged acts or omis-
sions arising out of or related to [their service] in Liberia, unless
such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that
contributing StateK”192 Similarly, SC Resolution 1593 vested con-
tributing states with exclusive jurisdiction over their nationals
for all “alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to opL
erations in SudanK”193 Addressing this SC practice, Leila Sadat
observed that “even the territorial state has been deprived of ju-
risdiction, and even if the contributing state declines to investi-
gate allegations of war crimesK”194
The authority of the SC to restrict the enforcement of interna-
tional criminal law extends also to the ICC. Article 16 of the
Rome Statute authorizes the SC, acting in the exercise of its
Chapter VII powers, to suspend ICC jurisdiction for a twelve-
month period and to renew such suspension by subsequent res-
olutions for further twelve-month periods.195 It has been noted
that Article 16 is ill-suited to support peace agreements that
grant amnesty to perpetrators of international crimesO as “[a]
twelve-month delay with possible failure to renew does not pro-
vide any permanence that an amnesty provision would need for
negotiated peaceK”196 The time limit in the suspension of ICC ju-
risdiction under Article 16 would also make it difficult to use this
190. Scott W. Lyons, Ineffective Amnesty: The Legal Impact on Negotiating
the End to Conflict, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 799, 838 (2012).
191. Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 955, 1032 (2006) (observing that “the recent practice of the Secu-
rity Council has been to accept (at least in some cases), language in Council
resolutions that may immunize nationals of certain countries from prosecution
for the commission of jus cogens crimes.”).
192. S.C. Res. 1497, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (Aug. 1, 2003).
193. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
194. Sadat, supra note 191, at 1032.
195. Rome Statute, supra note 152, art.16.
196. Lyons, supra note 190, at 838.
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Article to restrict ICC adjudication in accordance with the terms
of the advisory regime.
The SC, however, may exercise its Chapter VII powers outside
the scope of Article 16 to permanently restrict or terminate ICC
jurisdiction in relation to particular situations.197 The ICC exer-
cises the delegated territorial and nationality jurisdiction of
states that are parties to the Rome Statute.198 The broad power
of the SC to direct the conduct of states in the exercise of its
Chapter VII powers thus extends to the ICC, making the ICC
bound by SC Chapter VII resolutions that mandate ICC inaction
in particular situations.199
Note that the immunity granted to certain troops under SC
Resolutions 1497 and 1593 was not limited to prosecution in the
courts of foreign states. These resolutions also permanently pre-
cluded the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed by
such troops.200 It has been noted that “Resolution <835 did not
defer the ICC =urisdiction% it terminated itK”201 Resolution 1497
thus “departed from Article <6 of the Rome Statute governing
the eSercise of the Security Council’s deferral powersK”202
In addition to the power of the SC to directly restrict ICC ju-
risdiction, the SC may also exercise its Chapter VII powers to
preclude ICC proceedings indirectly. The capacity of the ICC to
pursue criminal investigations and prosecutions depends en-
197. Id. at 838@39.
198. Id. at 839.
199. Id. at 838@39 (observing that “the Security Council arguably could de-
cide that it is not bound by temporal limitations imposed by outside treaty ob-
ligations and could bind the ICC because the ICC exercises the delegated ter-
ritorial and nationality jurisdiction of State parties.”); id. at 840 (noting that
“the Security Council can likely decide to recognize a domestic amnesty agree-
ment and make it binding upon both States and the ICC under its same speci-
fied legal powers.”).
200. Ademola Abass, The Competence of the Security Council to Terminate
the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 40 TEX. INT’LL.J. 263, 268
(2005) (observing that “Resolution 1497 purports to preclude the ICC, on a per-
manent basis, from investigating or prosecuting any crimes committed by per-
sonnel serving as part of the Multinational Force in Liberia or a U.N. operation
when such persons are contributed by nonparties to the Rome Statute.”). See
also Sadat, supra note 191, at 1032, n. 357 (noting that the language of Reso-
lution 1497, which concerns the exclusive jurisdiction of contributing states,
“is substantially identical to Resolution 1593.”).
201. Abass, supra note 200, at 272.
202. Id.
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tirely on the cooperation of states with the Court. Such coopera-
tion includes, among other things, the surrender of individuals
to the custody of the Court.203 Acting under Chapter VII, the SC
may proscribe states from assisting ICC proceedings that do not
respect the immunities granted under the proposed advisory re-
gime.204 Under Article <I9 of the UKBK CharterO “WiVn the event of
a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligations under the
present Charter shall prevailK”205 It was thus observed that
“[w]hile the Rome Statute creates a treaty-based obligation to
turn in those indicted to the ICC, the supremacy clause of Article
103 of the U.N. Charter creates a superseding obligation. . . . The
obligations created by the Security Council using Chapter VII
powers would trump the conflicting commitments to the ICC. . .
.”206
C. Protections Against Non-Criminal Adjudicative Measures
The advisory regime would preclude adjudicative enforcement
measures taken against the operating state in relation to its mil-
itary operations before any judicial authority other than the op-
erating state’s own courtsK The advisory regime would also proL
tect the agents of the state from civil proceedings pursued in re-
lation to such operations before any foreign court. Such protec-
tions, grounded in the exercise by the SC of its binding powers
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, would be removed with
respect to conduct that the advisory panel has determined, based
on its post facto review, to be in violation of the law of war.
203. For a general account of the ICC’s dependence on state cooperation, see
Olympia Bekou & Robert Cryer, The International Criminal Court and Uni-
versal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?, 56 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 49, 60@61 (2007)
(“The ICC will not be effective unless States circumvent the lack of any real
supranational enforcement system by cooperating with the ICC. Practically
speaking, investigations would be extremely difficult, and, in essence, no trial
can take place at the ICC if States do not provide assistance. No trial can take
place without the defendant being surrendered by States to the custody of the
Court. . . .”).
204. Lyons, supra note 190, at 839 (noting that “the Security Council could
obligate all members of the U.N. to support the amnesty agreement and there-
fore preclude handing over to the ICC those potentially responsible for crimes
against humanity.”).
205. U.N. Charter, art. 103.
206. Lyons, supra note 190, at 839.
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States and their agents already enjoy far-reaching protections
against foreign civil proceedings under the doctrine of foreign
state immunity. In Germany v. Italy,207 the ICJ concluded that
customary international law grants a state complete immunity
from civil claims brought against the state before the courts of
other states in relation to the conduct of its armed forces in the
course of armed conflict.208 This immunity from proceedings be-
fore foreign national courts is not affected by the gravity of the
allegations against the state or the jus cogens status of the
norms breached.209
The judgment of the ICJ in Germany v. Italy concerned only
claims brought against the state itself.210 The prevailing view
within the international community is that state immunity be-
fore foreign national courts generally extends to civil claims
brought against individuals acting on behalf of the state, such
as members of the armed forces of a state or their political supe-
riors.211 National courts, however, disagree on whether the
agents of a state enjoy immunity before foreign national courts
also with regard to civil claims alleging violation of jus cogens
norms. In Jones v. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the English
House of Lords held that individuals acting as agents of the state
enjoy the full extent of immunity conferred under customary in-
ternational law upon the state itself, which is not affected by the
jus cogens status of the norms allegedly violated.212 This view
was also taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.213 By contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit construed customary international law to sup-
port the conclusion that “officials from other countries are not
entitled to foreign official immunity for jus cogens violations,
207. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. Italy, Greece Interven-
ing), 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 143 (Feb. 3).
208. Id. ¶¶ 77@78.
209. Id. ¶¶ 91, 97.
210. Id. ¶¶ 37@39 (stipulating the subject-matter of the dispute).
211. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 774 (4th Cir. 2012) (embracing “the
international law principle that sovereign immunity, which belongs to a for-
eign state, extends to an individual official acting on behalf of that foreign
state.”); Jones v. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, House of Lords, [2007] 1 AC
270, ¶¶ 10, 13.
212. Id. ¶ 85.
213. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 Fed. Appx. 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Matar
v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009).
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even if the acts were performed in WtheirV official capacityK”214
2ne commentator has noted that “the split that has developed
surrounding the jus cogens exception to immunity in U.S. circuit
courts may itself reflect the state of uncertainty in customary
international law and among foreign national precedents on this
'uestionK K K K”215 The protection against civil proceedings before
foreign courts available to the agents of an operating state under
the terms of the advisory regime would apply to the extent that,
in the view of a foreign court, such proceedings are not already
precluded under the doctrine of foreign state immunity.
The protections against non-criminal adjudication extended to
an operating state under the advisory regime would be more sig-
nificant in relation to proceedings before regional international
human rights courts, such as the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR). Both courts have adjudicated claims of human rights
violations brought by individuals against states in relation to
military operations that were part of hostilities amounting to a
non-international armed conflict.216
214. Yousuf v. Samantar, supra note 211, at 777.
215. Christopher D. Totten, The Adjudication of Foreign Official Immunity
Determinations in the United States Post-Samantar: A Circuit Split and Its
Implications, 26 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 517, 543 (2016).
216. In the Las Palmeras Case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR) scrutinized the exercise of lethal force by the Colombian military.
Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, ¶ 2, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 67 (Feb. 4, 2000). The Court did not dispute the conclusion of the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights that the actions of the Colom-
bian military were committed in the course of a non-international armed con-
flict between Colombia and guerrilla forces, but nonetheless asserted its com-
petence to adjudicate claims regarding violations of the American Convention
on Human Rights “in times of peace or armed conflict.” Id. ¶¶ 29, 32. Similarly,
in Bamaca Velasquez v. Guatemala, the Court adjudicated claims of human
rights violations committed by the armed forces of Guatemala against guerrilla
combatants in the course of a non-international armed conflict. Case of Bamaca
Velasquez v. Guat., ¶ 121(b) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70 (Nov. 25, 2000).
See also analysis in Michele D’Avolio, Regional Human Rights Courts and In-
ternal Armed Conflicts, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 305@06
(2007). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) scrutinized the conduct
of aerial bombardments by the Russian military in Chechnya, resulting in in-
jury to civilians. Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R.
847 (2005); Isayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 791 (2005). Although the EC-
tHR did not pronounce whether or not the actions of the Russian military were
committed in the course of a non-international armed conflict, the existence of
such a conflict could hardly be disputed in view of the scale and intensity of
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The legal guidance provided under the advisory regime would
be limited to the law of war. Yet, protections from international
adjudication granted to a state under the advisory regime must
be informed by the relationship between the law of war and in-
ternational human rights law. Elaborating on this relationship,
the ICJ concluded:
[T]he protection offered by human rights conventions does not
cease in case of armed conflict. . . . As regards the relationship
between international humanitarian law and human rights
law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may
be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; oth-
ers may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others
may be matters of both these branches of international law.217
In cases of concurrent applicability of human rights law and
the law of war, the latter prevails as lex specialis, taking prece-
dent over the former to the extent that the content of the law of
war departs from that of human rights law.218 The supremacy of
the law of war as lex specialis extends, among others, to all cases
of death, bodily injury, and destruction of property resulting
from hostilities.
The advisory panels should not be required to provide legal
guidance beyond the law of war, since such requirement would
significantly encumber efforts by the panels to draft the instruc-
tions in a timely manner. The extent of protection against pro-
ceedings before international courts provided to an operating
state under the advisory regime would correspond with the sub-
ject matter of the legal guidance provided by the panels.
Hence, the pronouncement by the advisory panel that an oper-
ating state is a party to an armed conflict would restrict the ju-
risdiction of international courts to adjudicate the conduct of the
state in such conflict to acts pronounced by the panel as a viola-
hostilities between Russian armed forces and Chechen guerrilla forces. See
William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 741, 753@54
(2005) (observing that the hostilities in Chechnya met the definition of an
armed conflict).
217. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 178 (July 9) [herein-
after Wall Advisory Opinion].
218. Id. See also Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2461, 2482 (2008).
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tion of the law of war. An international human rights court, how-
ever, would be able to inquire with the advisory panel whether
alleged violations of international human rights law by the op-
erating state fall outside the purview of the law of war and are
therefore “eSclusively matters of human rights lawK”219 An af-
firmative reply by the advisory panel would allow international
adjudication of the allegations against the state, even in the ab-
sence of a finding by the panel of a law of war violation.
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR suggests that the authority
vested in the SC under the U.N. Charter would accommodate
such restriction of the jurisdiction of international courts. In
Behrami and Samarati v. France,220 the ECtHR examined the
scope of its jurisdiction to scrutinize the conduct of French and
Norwegian troops operating as part of a NATO peacekeeping
force in Kosovo, pursuant to SC authorization.221 The Court ob-
served that all states that are parties to the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (ECHR) are members of the U.N. and that it must there-
fore construe its jurisdiction under the ECHR in view of Articles
25 and 103 of the U.N. Charter,222 which establish, respectively,
the power of the SC to issue resolutions that are legally binding
on all states and the supremacy of the obligations of states under
the Charter over all other treaty obligations.223 The Court then
proceeded to note that “the primary ob=ective of the U.N. is the
maintenance of international peace and securityO”224 acknowl-
edged “the imperative nature”225 of this objective, and considered
that under the Charter, the primary responsibility to fulfill it
was vested in the SC.226 The Court therefore bowed to SC au-
thority, concluding that it lacks jurisdiction to scrutinize mili-
219. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
220. Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway, Apps. No.
71412 & 78166/01 (May 2, 2007) (admissibility decision), http://hu-
doc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-80830.
221. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
222. Behrami v. France, supra note 220, ¶ 147.
223. U.N. Charter, arts. 25, 103.
224. Behrami v. France, supra note 220, ¶ 148.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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tary operations conducted by states pursuant to SC authoriza-
tion.227 2bserving that “the ECtFR demonstrated strong subL
stantive deference towards the UKBK Security CouncilO”228
Gráinne de Búrca explained:
The ECtHR positions itself as a specialized regional tribunal
established under international law and as part of an interna-
tional landscape in which the United Nations is the ultimate
global forum for transnational cooperation in pursuit of collec-
tive security, whose authority should not be open to question
by a regional human rights tribunal. . . . On this understand-
ing, the decisions of the Security Council adopted under Chap-
ter VII constitute a singular, hierarchical source of authority
which binds and overrides the ECHR and constrains the EC-
tHR from exercising even indirect jurisdiction over the effects
of such decisions.229
A different approach toward SC authority was taken by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). In Kadi & Al Barakaat Inter-
national Foundation v. Council and Commission,230 the ECJ an-
nulled anti-terrorism legislation enacted by the European Un-
ion, which implemented SC resolutions that required all states
to freeze the assets of individuals identified by the resolution as
suspected terrorists.231 The ECJ reasoned that the measure
mandated by the SC and implemented by the European Union
violated fundamental rights protected under EU law.232 The
Court then proceeded to conclude, without distinguishing be-
tween the U.N. Charter and other international treaties, that
“the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot
have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the
EC TreatyO”233 and that the European Union is an “autonomous
227. Id. ¶ 149. See also Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and
the International Legal Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 17 (2010) (not-
ing that “the heart of the judgment . . . seems to be the ECtHR’s desire to avoid
an open conflict with the Security Council and to defer to the 0organization of
universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective security objective.’”).
228. de Búrca, supra note 227, at 27.
229. Id. at 28.
230. Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v.
Council & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R I-6351.
231. Id. ¶ 372. See also S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000);
S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
232. Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, supra note 230,
¶¶ 353, 371.
233. Id. ¶ 285.
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legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an international
agreementK”234
Gráinne de B;rca observed that “the =udgment is striking for
its treatment of the U.N. Charter, at least insofar as its relation-
ship to [EU] law was concerned, as no more than any other in-
ternational treatyK”235 Yet, the approach taken by the ECJ to-
ward the U.N. Charter cannot be considered in separation from
the status of the EU as sui generis, an entity that is neither a
state nor an international organization. The Kadi judgment rep-
resents an attempt by the ECJ to define the relationship be-
tween EU law and international law in general,236 “emphasiRing
the separateness, autonomy, and constitutional priority of the
EC legal order over international lawK”237Hence, the significance
of theKadi decision in assessing the reach of SC authority seems
to be restricted to the unique circumstances of the European Un-
ion as an entity “situated somewhere between an international
organiRation and a constitutional polityO”238 the ECJ conse-
quently being neither a national court nor an international one.
D. Protection Against Economic Sanctions
Economic sanctions imposed by the SC in the exercise of its
powers under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter typically respond to
certain violations of international law. Coercing compliance with
international law is also an often-invoked rationale for the im-
position by states of unilateral economic sanctions against other
states.239 The fundamental bargain underlying the proposed ad-
visory regime depends on the exercise of SC powers to ensure, as
far as possible, that a choice by a state to follow the normative
path laid out by the international advisors would not give rise to
the adverse consequences that typically attach to violations of
the law of war. The credibility of such a bargain, in the eyes of
234. Id. ¶ 316.
235. de Búrca, supra note 227, at 23.
236. Id. at 5 (observing that “the ECJ seized this high-profile moment to send
out a strong and clear message about the relationship of EC law to interna-
tional law. . . .”).
237. Id. at 7.
238. Id. at 5.
239. Cleveland, supra note 74, at 4 (noting that “0unilateral’ economic sanc-
tions, or sanctions imposed without express regional or multilateral authori-
zation, have become one common domestic enforcement mechanism to encour-
age foreign states to comply with international norms.”).
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states, would be diminished if conduct by an operating state that
conforms to the instructions resulted in economic sanctions im-
posed, either by the SC or by individual states, in view of a vision
of the law of war that departs from the instructions.
Might an SC resolution establishing the advisory regime stip-
ulate that the SC would not impose economic sanctions to en-
force upon an operating state an interpretation of the law of war
that proscribes military operations permitted by the instruc-
tions? By undertaking such a commitment, the SC would effec-
tively cede a certain extent of its powers under Article 41 of the
Charter, allowing the advisory panels to determine, through
their instructions and review process, whether the SC may ex-
ercise these powers to promote humanitarian interests. The le-
gality of such a restriction on the exercise of SC powers is doubt-
ful. The U.N. Charter vests the ultimate authority in the SC for
the maintenance of international peace and security.240 It was
observed that the SC does not have the competence to divest it-
self of this authority by ceding it to another entity or other-
wise.241 Yet, the resolution establishing the advisory regime
could assure states that in considering whether the military ac-
tions of an operating state warrant the exercise by the SC of its
powers under Article 41 of the Charter, the SC takes into ac-
count the content of the instructions.
The exercise of SC powers to ban the imposition by states of
unilateral economic sanctions aimed at enforcing upon the oper-
ating state a vision of the law of war that departs from the in-
structions is also problematic. Customary international law has
not set any limitation upon the range of foreign policy interests
that a state may legally advance through the imposition of uni-
lateral economic sanctions.242 The SC may, in the exercise of its
240. U.N. Charter, arts. 24@25.
241. DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS
CHAPTERVII POWERS 4@16 (1999). Sarooshi observed that “[t]he Security Coun-
cil possesses a general competence to delegate its powers to certain entities.”
Id. at 16. Yet, “[a] delegation of powers does not involve the transfer of a power
in toto.” Id. at 7.
242. Cleveland, supra note 74, at 53 (“Customary international law tradition-
ally has allowed states to use economic coercion for a wide range of purposes,
and the relatively frequent use of economic sanctions by the United States and
other developed nations since World War II makes it difficult to conclude that
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powers to maintain international peace and security, prohibit a
state from taking measures that international law would other-
wise allow. Economic sanctions, however, concern the withhold-
ing of assistance and cooperation that would otherwise be ren-
dered voluntarily by one state to anotherO at the former’s discreL
tion. Restricting the freedom of states to impose economic sanc-
tions would, at least in part, revise the nature of economic assis-
tance rendered by one state to another from voluntary to invol-
untary. This would represent a far-reaching interference with
the sovereignty of states on the part of the SC, diminishing the
political feasibility of the proposed advisory regime.
Moreover, states have resorted to unilateral economic sanc-
tions on various grounds.243 A state could easily cite motivations
other than enforcing its own vision of the law of war (e.g., enforc-
ing compliance with jus ad bellum, promoting democracy, a for-
eign policy interest in promoting a ceasefire) as grounds for im-
posing unilateral economic sanctions against the operating state
in response to military operations by the latter.
The SC, however, may include within the resolution establish-
ing the advisory regime a non-binding clause requesting states
to refrain from imposing unilateral economic sanctions on an op-
erating state aimed at promoting humanitarian interests. Such
restraint would be requested for as long as the advisory panel
takes the view that the conduct of the operating state demon-
strates sufficient respect for the advisory regime to justify the
continued application of this regime.244 The SC “is valued to the
extent that all but a few states believe it serves a useful purpose
for the maintenance of peace and securityO”245 and it has been
a customary international norm exists against the practice. . . . Nothing in cus-
tomary international law, therefore, appears to bar the use of economic coer-
cion.”).
243. Id. at 4 (noting that “Western states traditionally have resorted to re-
strictions on foreign assistance and trade benefits to promote a range of social
goals. . . .”); id. at 31 (observing that “the United States has imposed economic
sanctions for many years to promote a range of foreign policy objectives, in-
cluding combating nuclear proliferation, drug and weapons trafficking and ter-
rorism; promoting democracy and human rights; destabilizing hostile regimes;
and punishing territorial aggression.”).
244. See supra Part III.F. (specifying the grounds for termination of the ad-
visory regime).
245. Ian Johnstone, Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better
Argument, 14 EURO. J. INT’L L. 437, 477 (2003).
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explicitly designated by the international community as the pri-
mary actor in the pursuit of these objectives. Hence, a pro-
nouncement by the SC that unilateral economic sanctions aimed
at promoting humanitarian interests would do the humanitar-
ian cause a disservice if imposed concurrently with the applica-
tion of the advisory regime presumably would go a long way to
dissuade Western economic powers from employing such sanc-
tions.
CONCLUSION
Indeterminacy in the law of war exacts a grave humanitarian
toll, and it is not likely to be reduced through the conclusion of
new humanitarian law treaties. The adverse consequences of
this indeterminacy could be mitigated through SC action estab-
lishing an international advisory regime and employing the
broad powers of the SC to provide incentives for states to volun-
tarily subscribe to this regime. Such incentives would consist of
protection against the potential costs of non-compliance with the
law of war, resulting from the interpretive liberties of the vari-
ous law of war compliance agents. States subscribing to the ad-
visory regime would undertake to follow the interpretation of the
law of war laid out by international advisors. Although such un-
dertaking would not be legally binding upon the states, it would
go a long way to promote compliance on their part with the legal
guidance provided under the advisory regime.
The proposed advisory regime is desirable from a humanitar-
ian perspective because it would enable the SC to leverage the
potential costs for a state resulting from current indeterminacy
in the law in a manner that would induce states to accept legal
restraints on their military operations, which at present they
would reject. This regime is intended primarily to allay the ad-
verse consequences of indeterminacy in the law of war. Ulti-
mately, the incentive structure underlying the proposed advi-
sory regime would enhance compliance with the law of war in
general.
